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This paper considers a model of a rating agency with multiple clients, in which
each client has a separate market that forms a belief about the quality of the client
after the agency issues a rating. When the clients are rated separately (individ-
ual rating), the credibility of a good rating in an inflationary equilibrium of the
signaling game is limited by the incentive of the agency to exaggerate the quality
of the client. With a centralized rating, the agency rates all clients together and
shares the rating information among all markets. This allows the agency to coor-
dinate the ratings and achieve a higher average level of credibility for its good rat-
ings than with individual rating. Under decentralized rating, the ratings are again
shared among all markets, but each client is rated by a self-interested rater of the
agency with no access to the quality information of other clients. When the under-
lying qualities of the clients are correlated, decentralized rating leads to a smaller
degree of rating inflation and hence a greater level of credibility than under indi-
vidual rating. Comparing centralized rating with decentralized rating, we find that
centralized rating dominates decentralized rating for the agency when the under-
lying qualities are weakly correlated, but the reverse holds when the qualities are
strongly correlated.
K. Signaling, credibility, individual rating, centralized rating, decentral-
ized rating.
JEL . C72, D82.
1. I
Consider a rating agency that issues a report on each of its clients. The rating agency is
informed of the quality of each client and its report on the client is received as a signal
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by the market that the client faces. The agency cares about the payoff to each client.
Examples of a rating agency with multiple clients include an economics department
that evaluates its PhD graduates, a stock brokerage firm that deals with multiple stocks,
and a consumer electronics magazine that issues ratings on multiple products. We are
interested in an environment in which the payoff to each client depends only on the per-
ceived quality of that client, and not on the perceived qualities of other clients, so that
there is no direct payoff link among the clients. The only possible link is informational:
when the markets are given access to all client ratings, the perceived quality of each
client can depend on the ratings of other clients, either exogenously through some sta-
tistical correlation among client qualities, or endogenously through the reporting strat-
egy of the agency, or both. In the economics department example, the payoff link is
likely to be absent if the PhD graduates are in different fields so that their markets are
separate, or if the markets are sufficiently thick that each graduate receives a competi-
tive wage, while the informational link will be present if there are strong cohort effects
in the graduate program or if the department ranks the students by comparing them.
Similarly, for the stock brokerage firm example and the consumer magazine example,
there may be little demand substitutability or complementarity in the aggregate so that
the price of a rated stock or an electronic product depends only on the valuation of that
stock or product,1 but a positive correlation among the client qualities can still arise, for
example, if the future returns of all the stocks are affected by an economy-wide shock
or the electronic products share significant common parts or designs. In our model, be-
cause the agency cares about the perceived qualities of its clients, the credibility of the
ratings is at issue. The objective of this paper is to compare the credibility of ratings un-
der three schemes that differ in whether the markets have access to all the reports and
in whether the raters in the agency share the knowledge about client qualities.
Under “individual rating,” the market for each client does not observe the ratings for
other clients. This is a natural benchmark due to the absence of any direct payoff link-
age. The rating scheme can be analyzed as a simple signaling model with one sender
(the rating agency with a single client) and a receiver (the market for the client), with
the market interested only in making the right inference about the client’s underlying
quality. We make assumptions on the payoff function of the agency regarding its rep-
utational concerns and how these concerns interact with the derived benefits from an
improved perception of the client quality. These assumptions imply that the incentive
to exaggerate the quality always outweighs the reverse incentive to downplay it. This
“single crossing” property allows us to focus on the “inflationary equilibrium,” which is
a semi-pooling equilibrium where the client’s quality is truthfully revealed whenever it
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single stock does not affect the pricing kernel, and so the payoffs for different stocks are separable. For
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is good and sometimes exaggerated when it is bad. The benchmark model of individual
rating can be interpreted as a model of credibility. The equilibrium perception of a good
rating measures credibility and there is a one-to-one correspondence between credibil-
ity and the equilibrium ex ante payoff of the agency. The inability of the rating agency to
commit to an honest rating policy dilutes the meaning of a good rating without changing
the meaning of a bad rating, and therefore reduces the rating agency’s ex ante payoff. We
ask the following question in the rest of the paper: can the rating agency obtain a higher
ex ante payoff than in the inflationary equilibrium under individual rating by improving
the credibility of good ratings?
Under “centralized rating,” the agency rates all clients together and shares the re-
ports among all markets. Each market can use the ratings of other clients as well as its
own client to make an inference about the quality of the latter. When the rating infor-
mation is shared among all markets, the agency can effectively coordinate the ratings
of its client. For example, the agency can employ a correlated randomization strategy
between good and bad ratings across clients of bad quality, even when client qualities
are statistically independent. It turns out that correlated randomization is necessary
to improve the agency’s payoff beyond the benchmark inflationary equilibrium under
individual rating. We show that there exists an equilibrium that weakly dominates the
benchmark inflationary equilibrium for the agency, and that an equilibrium that strictly
dominates it exists when the prior probability that no client has good quality is small.
Under “decentralized rating,” the ratings are shared among all markets, as under
centralized rating, but each client is rated by a self-interested rater of the agency with
no access to the quality information of other clients. This means that only independent
randomization across clients of bad quality is possible, as under individual rating. How-
ever, unlike under individual rating, ratings information is shared among all markets,
thus the perception of a good rating depends on the total number of good ratings in all
markets. This endogenous payoff link among the clients makes it more difficult for each
rater to fool the market with an exaggerated rating. As a result, the equilibrium proba-
bility of an inflationary rating can be lower and the average credibility of a good rating
can be higher than in the benchmark inflationary equilibrium under individual rating,
leading to a greater equilibrium payoff for the agency.
The comparison between centralized rating and decentralized rating in terms of
equilibrium credibility of good ratings and ex ante payoff to the agency depends on the
degree of correlation. When the underlying qualities are independently distributed, any
inflationary equilibrium under decentralized rating is payoff-equivalent to the bench-
mark inflationary equilibrium under individual rating, as the ratings of other clients
cannot discipline each individual rater and thus there is no gain in credibility. In con-
trast, with independent qualities, an equilibrium that strictly dominates the benchmark
equilibrium typically exists under centralized rating. With correlation across the under-
lying qualities, there is less room to manipulate ratings under both centralized rating
and decentralized rating. When the underlying qualities are almost perfectly correlated,
under centralized rating there is no inflationary equilibrium that strictly dominates the
benchmark equilibrium under individual rating, as the strong correlation across client
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qualities severely reduces the credibility of coordinated rating. In contrast, under de-
centralized rating the discipline on credibility imposed by strong correlation allows the
construction of an inflationary equilibrium that is arbitrarily close to truth-telling. Thus,
centralized rating is dominated by decentralized rating for the agency with strong cor-
relation.
Our comparison results regarding individual rating, centralized rating, and decen-
tralized rating have strong implications for how an agency can gain credibility for its
ratings and improve its welfare. Since there exist inflationary equilibria that weakly
dominate the benchmark under either centralized or decentralized rating schemes, it
is always to the advantage of the agency to share ratings information among all the
markets it serves. Whether the agency should share information about client qualities
among its raters, or commit to a policy that restricts information access and preserves
the raters’ independent concerns for career reputation, depends on the underlying cor-
relation structure across client qualities. Our results suggest that the agency should
group together clients with weakly correlated qualities and centralize their rating, but
for clients with strongly correlated qualities the agency should decentralize their rating
among the raters.
It is interesting to interpret our comparison results between centralized rating and
decentralized rating in terms of different market structures for rating agencies as op-
posed to different information structures for a single rating agency. The centralized
rating scheme naturally corresponds to the monopoly market structure, while the de-
centralized scheme can be equivalently viewed as the competitive market structure.
Although under the decentralized scheme there is no direct competition among the
agencies because the clients have separate markets, the agencies indirectly compete for
credibility as the ratings are observed by all markets. Our results then suggest that the
comparison between the two market structures depends on the degree of correlation
across the underlying states of nature. The monopoly structure performs better due to
an economy of scale when the states are weakly correlated. When the states are strongly
correlated, the competitive structure does better because competing ratings constrain
the incentive to inflate and improve the credibility of good ratings.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic ingredients of our
model of rating agencies. We introduce the out-of-equilibrium belief refinement used
throughout the paper, and characterize an inflationary equilibrium under individual
rating that serves as the benchmark of comparison. In Section 3 we deal with central-
ized rating. This turns out to be a signaling model with one-dimensional private in-
formation and multi-dimensional signals. We establish the existence of an inflationary
equilibrium that weakly dominates the benchmark inflationary equilibrium of individ-
ual rating for the agency in terms of expected payoff. We provide a sufficient condition
for the existence of an equilibrium that strictly dominates the benchmark inflationary
equilibrium. Section 4 presents the model of decentralized rating. We introduce a cor-
relation structure that accommodates possibilities of both positive and negative corre-
lation across client qualities in a multi-dimensional setting. With this structure, and
under further assumptions on the payoff functions of the agency, we show that there
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exists an inflationary equilibrium that weakly dominates the benchmark inflationary
equilibrium of individual rating for the agency in terms of expected payoff. In Section 5
we study how the comparison between centralized rating and decentralized rating de-
pends on the correlation across client qualities. Using a specific correlation structure
and focusing on the limit case when the number of clients is arbitrarily large, we show
that increasing correlation leads to more ratings inflation, lower credibility of good rat-
ings, and lower equilibrium payoff to the agency under centralized rating, while the op-
posite occurs under decentralized rating. Section 6 provides some remarks on related
literature. Proofs of all lemmas can be found in the Appendix.
2. A    
A rating agency deals with N clients. In our model the N sets of relationships between
each client i , i = 1, . . . , N , and the corresponding market (end-user of the rating for the
client) are identical. The underlying quality Si of each client i is either good (G ) or bad
(B); the rating s i for the client is either good (g ) or bad (b ). The objective function of
market i is to minimize the expectation of the squared difference between a real-valued
decision variable δi and a random variable that is equal to 1 if Si = G and 0 if Si = B .
Let qi denote the market’s (endogenous) belief that the quality of the client is good. The
optimal decision for market i is to setδi equal to qi . The realized loss is (1−qi )2 if Si =G ,
and q 2i if Si =q
2
i . We write the rating agency’s payoff function from client i as U (Si , s i ,qi )
for Si =G , B and s i = g ,b .2 The total payoff to the agency is the sum
∑N
i=1 U (Si , s i ,qi ).
For the statistical distribution of client qualities, at this point we assume only that
the client qualities are exchangeable random variables: the probability of any realiza-
tion of the random vector (S1, . . . ,SN ) depends only on the number of clients of good
quality. The joint probability distribution of (S1, . . . ,SN ) can then be represented by a
vector (pi0, . . . ,piN ), where pin is the probability that there are exactly n clients of good
quality. We assume that pin > 0 for each n = 0, 1, . . . , N . Define pi as the probability that
any given client is of good quality, which satisfies
pi=
1
N
N∑
n=1
npin . (1)
The assumption of exchangeability introduces symmetry across clients, which simpli-
fies our analysis without imposing statistical independence. In the applications of the
model that we have in mind, correlated client qualities might be an important feature.
For example, student qualities might be correlated through peer effects, stock valuations
through some underlying common fundamental, and electronic products through com-
mon design features. It turns out that the specific correlation structure does not play
any role in our equilibrium construction under a centralized rating scheme. We need to
2In our model ratings are not cheap talk. Further, we make the implicit assumption that for each client
the message space is the same as the type space and we focus on the comparison between centralized
and decentralized rating schemes. The analysis of games in which a richer set of costly signals is available
requires additional setup and is beyond the scope of this paper.
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make further assumptions on the correlation structure when we analyze decentralized
rating.
A few remarks about the setup are in order. First, the specific preference function
adopted here for the markets is meant to capture the idea that each client faces com-
petitive bids after the market updates its belief about the quality of the client based on
the reports of the agency. This reduces the role of the receiver in our signaling model to
forming rational expectations of the client quality, and allows us to focus on the signal-
ing incentives of the agency. Second, the payoff of the agency in the relationship with
client i is assumed to depend on the market’s belief qi about client i ’s quality, which
summarizes the payoff to the client. This models the idea that the agency is not an im-
partial provider of information, in that it cares about the payoff to the client. Third, both
the underlying quality Si and the signal s i enter the payoff function of the agency. This
form allows for any two-state, two-signal setup. The general idea is that the payoff of
the agency is affected both by the payoff to the client and by its own reputational con-
cerns, and we are using the function U as a reduced-form representation of the agency’s
payoff. Later we make further assumptions on how the concern for the client’s payoff
and the reputational concerns interact with each other. Finally, the payoff of the agency
is assumed to be additively separable in the utilities from the N sets of client relation-
ships. This separability assumption is justified if the payoff to each client i depends
only on the belief qi about the client’s quality. As mentioned in the introduction, there
are environments in the labor market, the financial market, and the goods market in
which this assumption is reasonably appropriate. We do not claim that it holds in all
relevant situations for rating agencies. Rather, the separability assumption is made to
focus exclusively on informational issues of ratings.
We need to make further assumptions on the common payoff function U . We drop
the subscript i for now as there is no risk of confusion. First, we assume that the deriva-
tive of U (S, s ,q ) with respect to q , Uq (S, s ,q ), exists and is strictly positive for each q ∈
(0, 1).3
A 1. Uq (S, s ,q ) exists and is strictly positive for each S = G , B , s = g ,b , and
q ∈ (0, 1).
Signaling games often have a multiplicity of equilibria. One way to minimize the
equilibrium selection issue is to ensure that if the agency weakly prefers g to b when
the quality is B , then it strictly prefers g to b in state G , and, conversely, if the agency
weakly prefers b to g in state G , then it strictly prefers b to g when the quality is B . This
condition may be referred to as “single-crossing.” We use it to construct equilibria that
involve only one form of misrepresentation, referred to as “inflationary rating,” which is
issuing a good rating when the quality is bad, rather than “deflation,” or issuing a bad
rating when the quality is good. For the single-crossing result to be effective in con-
structing inflationary equilibria, we need it to hold regardless of how different ratings
3This rules out situations where the market’s response to the agency’s rating is discrete—for example,
where the only choice of the market is whether or not to acquire the client’s service at some fixed wage.
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induce different beliefs:
U (G , g ,q )−U (G ,b ,q ′)>U (B , g ,q )−U (B ,b ,q ′) (2)
for all q ,q ′ ∈ [0, 1]. Condition (2) can be thought of as payoff complementarity between
the underlying quality S and the rating g , modified to suit the signaling model so that
it holds whenever a switch of the underlying quality for the same rating does not affect
the belief q while a switch of the rating for the same quality generally affects q .4
The following assumption on the payoff functions U (S, s ,q ), together with Assump-
tion 1, immediately leads to condition (2).5
A 2. Uq (G , g ,q )>Uq (B , g ,q ), Uq (G ,b ,q )<Uq (B ,b ,q ) for any q ∈ (0, 1), and
U (G , g , 0)−U (G ,b , 0)>U (B , g , 0)−U (B ,b , 0). (3)
One may interpret the difference U (G , g , ·)−U (B , g , ·) as a measure of the agency’s rep-
utational concern for honesty. Given the same rating g and any belief q , U (B , g ,q ) dif-
fers from U (G , g ,q ) because the agency is concerned that the true quality of the client
may be discovered, thus revealing a dishonest rating. Similarly, the difference U (B ,b , ·)−
U (G ,b , ·) is a measure of the agency’s reputational concern for competence: for the same
rating b and any q , U (G ,b ,q ) differs from U (B ,b ,q ) because when the true quality of the
client is discovered, it reveals an inaccurate rating. Assumption 2 requires both differ-
ences to be increasing in the client’s perceived quality q . This assumption is motivated
by the idea that it is more likely (or faster) that the market learns the true quality of the
client when the perceived quality is higher. For the consumer magazine example men-
tioned in the introduction, if an electronic product is new to the market and is of an
experience good variety, a higher perceived quality leads to greater sales and faster con-
sumer learning about its true quality. Similarly, a higher market belief about the quality
of a job candidate is more likely to result in a better and more challenging job place-
ment, which can quickly reveal the true quality of the candidate, and a higher valuation
about a rated stock may lead to a greater transaction volume, which motivates more
subsequent research.
A 3. U (B , g , 1)>U (B ,b , 0)>U (B , g , 0).
This assumption makes the individual rating scheme, analyzed in the next subsection,
a benchmark model of credibility.6 When the quality is B , the agency has an incentive
4Condition (2) is stronger than we need for the purpose of the analysis; single-crossing requires it to
hold only when the right-hand-side is non-negative.
5To see this, note that since Uq (G , g ,q ) > Uq (B , g ,q ), we have U (G , g ,q ) −U (B , g ,q ) ≥ U (G , g , 0) −
U (B , g , 0) for any q . Similarly, since Uq (G ,b ,q )<Uq (B ,b ,q ), we have U (G ,b ,q ′)−U (B ,b ,q ′)≤U (G ,b , 0)−
U (B ,b , 0) for any q ′. Condition (2) then follows from inequality (3) in Assumption 2. Also, the inequalities
are sufficient but not necessary for the single-crossing condition (2). Our analysis of individual rating and
decentralized rating goes through as long as (2) holds, but the two inequality conditions on Uq are used for
the equilibrium construction in the case of centralized rating.
6If the first inequality of the assumption is violated, the agency always prefers to report truthfully when
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to issue an inflationary rating if it results in a sufficiently favorable belief, but there is no
incentive to inflate if beliefs cannot be favorably manipulated. Together with Assump-
tion 1, it implies that there is a unique q ∗ ∈ (0, 1) that satisfies
U (B , g ,q ∗) =U (B ,b , 0). (4)
The value of q ∗ can be thought of as an inverse measure of the incentive to inflate when
the client quality is bad.
The final assumption is a strengthening of the single-crossing condition (2). It turns
out that under decentralized rating, the single-crossing condition is sufficient for the
existence of an inflationary equilibrium, just as under individual rating. However, under
centralized rating, the condition needs to be strengthened to ensure the construction of
inflationary equilibria.
A 4. For any q ∈ (q ∗, 1),
U (G , g ,q )−U (G ,b , 0)
U (B , g ,q )−U (B ,b , 0) >
Uq (G , g ,q )
Uq (B , g ,q )
.
By Assumption 3, the denominator of the left-hand-side of the this inequality is positive.
It then follows from Assumption 2 that the numerator also is positive, and in fact, both
the left-hand-side and the right-hand-side are greater than 1. Assumption 4 strength-
ens condition (2) for market beliefs that are more favorable than the benchmark belief
defined by equation (4). Alternatively, the assumption can be viewed as imposing an
upper bound on U (G ,b , 0), which is the payoff to the agency from a client of quality G
when it issues the rating b . Assumption 4 thus requires the payoff to be sufficiently low,
or the reputational concerns for competence to be sufficiently great. This assumption
is used in the construction of inflationary equilibria under centralized rating to regulate
the incentives to issue deflationary ratings.
Specific examples where all four assumptions are satisfied can easily be constructed.
For example, suppose that U (S, s ,q ) is linear in q for each S = G , B and s = g ,b . Then,
as long as misreporting entails some cost for the agency and the cost is not so large
that truthtelling is a dominant strategy (that is, U (G , g ,q ) >U (G ,b ,q ) and U (B ,b ,q ) >
U (B , g ,q ) for all q ∈ [0, 1] but U (B , g , 1) > U (B ,b , 0)), then all assumptions are sat-
isfied when the slope restrictions in Assumption 2 are respected. Alternatively, con-
sider a simple model where the agency’s payoff from truthtelling depends only on the
market belief q , and its payoff from misreporting is a fraction of the truthtelling pay-
off because with a positive probability the misreporting is discovered and the agency’s
payoff is zero. That is, there exists a strictly increasing and positive-valued function
τ(q ) and a number κ between 0 and 1, such that U (G , g ,q ) = U (B ,b ,q ) = τ(q ), and
the client quality is bad. If the second inequality is violated, then regardless of the prior belief about the
client quality, under individual rating it is an equilibrium to issue a good rating whether the client quality is
good or bad, and this is the only inflationary equilibrium. Neither case provides an interesting benchmark
model of credibility. Note that the assumption below does not rule out a pooling inflationary equilibrium.
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U (G ,b ,q ) =U (B , g ,q ) = (1−κ)τ(q ). Then, Assumptions 1, 2, 4, and the second inequal-
ity of Assumption 3 are immediately satisfied. As long as κ is not so large that the agency
always prefers to report truthfully, then also the first part of Assumption 3 is satisfied.7
2.1 Individual rating: A model of credibility
Under individual rating, the market for each client has no access to ratings for other
clients. Since the clients are exchangeable, the model reduces to N identical signaling
games involving the agency and the market. In each such game, an inflationary rating
strategy is such that the agency issues g under quality G and randomizes between g and
b under quality B . Suppose that there exists p ∈ (0, 1) such that
pi
pi+(1−pi)p =q
∗, (5)
where pi is given in equation (1). Then, we have a semi-separating equilibrium in which
the agency issues g under B with probability p : by equation (4) the agency is indifferent
between g and b under quality B , which by the single-crossing condition (2) implies that
the agency strictly prefers g to b under quality G . We refer to this type of inflationary
equilibrium as a “full support inflationary equilibrium,” as the support of the equilib-
rium strategy is the same as the space of the signals. Since equation (5) can be satisfied
by some p ∈ (0, 1) only if pi < q ∗, a full support equilibrium does not exist if pi ≥ q ∗. In-
stead, we can construct a “non-full support equilibrium,” in which the agency issues g
with probability 1 under B . This is accomplished by specifying the out-of-equilibrium
belief that the quality of the client is B with probability 1 when b is observed. Since the
equilibrium belief that the quality is G when g is observed is equal to the prior proba-
bility pi, the agency weakly prefers g to b under quality B , which implies that it strictly
prefers g to b under G by (2). Further, due to the same single-crossing condition (2),
the above specification of the out-of-equilibrium belief is the only one consistent with
the refinement concept of “Divinity” (Banks and Sobel 1987).8 We use this refinement
throughout the paper, and we refer to a sequential equilibrium that passes the refine-
ment test simply as an equilibrium. It follows that there is a unique inflationary equi-
librium under individual rating, which is full support if q ∗ > pi and non-full support if
q ∗ ≤pi.9
The model of individual rating can be interpreted as a model of credibility. Upon
observing a good rating, the market’s perception of the client’s quality is q ∗ in a full sup-
port equilibrium, and pi in a non-full support equilibrium. This market belief quanti-
fies equilibrium credibility in our model. From the equilibrium indifference condition
7The example can be modified to make the agency’s payoff depend on the client’s underlying quality,
and to allow a different probability of discovering misreporting when the agency is inflating or deflating.
8More precisely, for any out-of-equilibrium belief qˆ that the quality is G after b is observed, U (G ,b , qˆ )≥
U (G , g ,pi) implies that U (B ,b , qˆ )>U (B , g ,pi). Thus, qˆ = 0 under the refinement of Banks and Sobel (1987).
9With additional assumptions, we can show that no other equilibrium exists under individual rating. In
particular, if U (G , g , 1) >U (G ,b , 1), then we can rule out all “deflationary” equilibria in which the agency
issues b with a positive probability under quality G . However, since the focus of this paper is on the cred-
ibility of good ratings, we are interested only in constructing inflationary equilibria under different rating
schemes.
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(4), we see that the value of q ∗ depends only on the function U (B , g , ·) and the value of
U (B ,b , 0). When the prior probability of good quality is higher than q ∗, an increase in
the prior translates into an increase in the equilibrium credibility of good ratings by the
same amount, which allows the agency to simply pass any client of bad quality as one of
good quality. In contrast, when the prior probability is lower than q ∗, an increase in the
prior has no effect on the equilibrium credibility. The increase in the prior probability
means that a good rating is too attractive if the agency keeps the probability of reporting
g in state B unchanged, and so the probability of an inflated good rating must increase
to restore the equilibrium indifference condition. As a result, the equilibrium credibil-
ity, and hence the payoff to the agency, is pinned down by the indifference condition
so long as the agency reports b with positive probability in equilibrium. In equilibrium
the agency gets its complete information payoff U (B ,b , 0) under quality B , but its equi-
librium payoff under quality G is U (G , g ,q ), which is strictly lower than the complete
information payoff U (G , g , 1). Thus, the ex ante payoff to the agency (before the client’s
quality is revealed) is lower than what the agency would obtain if it could commit to
truthful revelation of the quality.
Our definition of credibility corresponds one-to-one with the expected marginal
value of information provided by the rating in equilibrium. In the absence of any rat-
ing, the optimal decision of each market i is to set δi to pi. The expected loss is therefore
pi(1−pi). In a full support inflationary equilibrium, when the client quality is good the
realized loss of the market is (1−q ∗)2; when the quality is bad the realized loss is (q ∗)2
if g is issued, and 0 if b is issued. Using equation (5), the equilibrium expected loss is
pi(1−q ∗). Thus, a greater value for q ∗ means a lower expected loss to the market, and a
greater marginal value of the information provided by the rating. Of course, in a non-full
support equilibrium, there is no information in the equilibrium rating.
3. C : A   - 
This section considers centralized rating, in which a single rater of the agency rates all
N clients and shares the rating information among all markets. Although the payoff to
each client depends only on the market’s perception of the quality of this client, un-
der centralized rating all the reports are used to make an inference about the quality of
each client. This means that the agency can potentially coordinate the N ratings in an
attempt to influence market perception.
It may not be intuitive that centralized rating creates opportunities for the agency to
increase the credibility of good ratings relative to individual rating, especially if the client
qualities are statistically independent. Indeed, it is easy to see that in the case of inde-
pendent qualities, the equilibrium outcome of individual rating can be supported under
centralized rating if the agency independently randomizes between g and b for each
client of bad quality with the same probability of choosing b as under individual rating.
In this case, the market belief about the quality of any client i with a good rating remains
q ∗, regardless of the other ratings, as they provide no information about client i ’s qual-
ity under independent qualities and independent randomization. Moreover, this is the
only equilibrium outcome under independent randomization. Indeed, a more general
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result is established below: even when the qualities are correlated and randomizations
are coordinated among the clients, any inflationary equilibrium is payoff-equivalent to
the benchmark inflationary equilibrium with belief q ∗ as long as N bad ratings are is-
sued with a positive probability in equilibrium. The key to improved credibility under
centralized rating relative to individual rating is to construct an inflationary equilibrium
in which the agency never reports N bad ratings, and we provide a characterization
of the structure of any such equilibrium. The main result of this section establishes a
necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an equilibrium with improved
credibility. This condition requires the prior probability of having N bad qualities to be
sufficiently low, so that it is credible for the agency never to issue N bad ratings.
Formally, for the rating agency, the state is now an N -dimensional vector (S1, . . . ,SN )
where Si ∈ {G , B} for i = 1, . . . , N . The signal is similarly an N -dimensional vector
(s1, . . . , sN ) where s i ∈ {g ,b} for i = 1, . . . , N . Given that S1, . . . ,SN are exchangeable, we
impose a symmetry requirement that the market belief about any client i ’s quality de-
pends only on the rating s i of the client and the total number good ratings issued by
the agency. For any i = 1, . . . , N , let q (m ) be the market belief that Si = G when s i = g
and #{j : s j = g } = m . Similarly, define qˆ (m ) to be the market belief that Si = G when
s i = b and #{j : s j = g } = m . Given the state, the agency chooses the signal vector
(s1, . . . , sN ) to maximize the sum of utilities
∑N
i=1 U (Si , s i ,qi ) where qi = q (m ) if s i = g
and qi = qˆ (m ) if s i = b for all m = #{j : s j = g }. It directly follows from the single-
crossing condition (2) that while the agency may have an incentive to mislead the mar-
kets about the total number of clients of good quality, it has no incentive to mislead the
markets about the identity of clients of good quality. That is, for any i = 1, . . . , N , when
#{j : S j = G } ≤ #{j : s j = g }, then Si = G implies s i = g .10 The same is true about
the identity of clients of bad quality when the agency deflates the number of clients of
good quality. As a result, we can reduce the state space to a one-dimensional variable
representing the number of clients of good quality. Denote the signaling strategy of the
agency as p (m ; n ), the probability of giving m good ratings when n clients are of good
quality. Note that the strategy is multi-dimensional because for each number n we need
to specify a vector of probability numbers p (m ; n ) for m = 0, . . . , N . Obviously, we re-
quire
∑N
m=0 p (m ; n ) = 1 for all n = 0, . . . , N .
Let W (m ; n ) be the expected payoff to the agency when it chooses m good ratings
and the number of good quality clients is n . For m ≥ n , we have
W (m ; n ) = nU (G , g ,q (m ))+ (m −n )U (B , g ,q (m ))+ (N −m )U (B ,b , qˆ (m )).
For m ≤ n , we have
W (m ; n ) = mU (G , g ,q (m ))+ (n −m )U (G ,b , qˆ (m ))+ (N −n )U (B ,b , qˆ (m )).
10To see this, let #{j : S j = G } = n and #{j : s j = g } = m . If #{j : S j = G and s j = g } = n , the expected
payoff to the agency is nU (G , g ,q (m ))+(m−n )U (B , g ,q (m ))+(N −m )U (B ,b , qˆ (m )). If instead #{j : S j =G
and s j = g } = n ′ < n , the expected payoff to the agency is reduced by (n − n ′) times [U (G , g ,q (m ))−
U (G ,b , qˆ (m ))]− [U (B , g ,q (m ))−U (B ,b , qˆ (m ))], which is positive by condition (2).
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An inflationary strategy satisfies p (m ; n ) = 0 for all n and all m < n . Using Assump-
tion 2, we have the following restriction on equilibrium strategies.11
L 1. For any n < n ′ ≤ m , m ′ and q (m ′) > q (m ), if W (m ′; n ) ≥ W (m ; n ), then
W (m ′; n ′)>W (m ; n ′).
Thus, in any inflationary equilibrium, the incentive to inflate to a signal with a more
favorable belief about good ratings is stronger when there are more clients of good qual-
ity. Note that the relative incentive to inflate depends on how favorably the signal is
received, and not directly on how many good ratings the signal contains. Given an infla-
tionary equilibrium let T = {m :∑Nn=0 p (m ; n )> 0} be the set of all signals that are issued
with positive probability, and let l = min T be the smallest signal (with the lowest num-
ber of good ratings). Define Tn = {m : p (m ; n )> 0} as the set of signals sent with positive
probabilities when there are n clients of good quality. In an inflationary equilibrium, for
each m ∈ T , the market beliefs upon observing m good ratings are
q (m ) =
∑N
n=0pin p (m ; n )n
m
∑N
n=0pin p (m ; n )
and qˆ (m ) = 0.
The following lemma distinguishes two types of inflationary equilibria, one that is
payoff-equivalent to the full support inflationary equilibrium under individual rating
with q (m ) =q ∗ for each equilibrium message m ∈ T , and the other payoff-superior.
L 2. In any inflationary equilibrium, (i) if l = 0, then q (m ) = q ∗ for all m > 0 and
m ∈ T , and (ii) if l > 0, then either q (m ) = q ∗ for all m ∈ T or q (m ) > q (m ′) > q ∗ for
m , m ′ ∈ T and m <m ′.
An inflationary equilibrium with l = 0 does not have full support if T 6= {0, 1, . . . , N }.
However, part (i) of Lemma 2 establishes that any inflationary equilibrium with l = 0
is payoff-equivalent to the full support inflationary equilibrium under individual rating.
Although each market can use the ratings of other clients as well as that of its own client
to make inferences about the quality of the latter, the rating agency gains no credibility
relative to individual rating. In any such equilibrium, when all clients have bad quality,
the agency is indifferent between issuing zero good ratings and issuing any number of
good ratings in T . These indifference conditions reduce centralized rating to individ-
ual rating in terms of payoff to the agency.12 Part (ii) of Lemma 2 establishes that in an
11In the Appendix, the same lemma also establishes that for any m ≤ n < n ′ ≤m ′, if W (m ′; n )≥W (m ; n )
then W (m ′; n ′) > W (m ; n ′), and for any m , m ′ ≤ n ′ < n and qˆ (m ′) > qˆ (m ), if W (m ′; n ) ≥ W (m ; n ), then
W (m ′; n ′)>W (m ; n ′). These two additional parts are needed to restrict out-of-equilibrium beliefs in infla-
tionary equilibria.
12The proof of this result (in the Appendix) is more complicated than indicated by this reasoning, because
we have to allow for non-full support strategies. This requires the use of the refinement. Later, we will show
that all inflationary equilibria have the threshold property that T = {l , . . . , N }. However, if we restrict to
strategies that satisfy this property, then Lemma 2 and parts (i) through (iii) of Lemma 3 below can be
established using the equilibrium conditions, without resorting to the refinement.
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F 1. Structure of equilibrium strategy
equilibrium with l > 0, either the same indifference conditions are again at work and
the market belief corresponding to a good rating is the same regardless of the number
of good ratings issued and equal to q ∗, or the market beliefs are all strictly greater than
q ∗. In the second case, the beliefs decrease in the number of good ratings issued, for
otherwise the agency would inflate as much as possible. The second type of inflation-
ary equilibria is more interesting, because the agency’s ex ante payoff is higher than in
the benchmark full support individual rating case.13 From now on, we distinguish equi-
libria according to whether they are payoff-equivalent to the full support equilibrium
under individual rating: equilibria with l > 0 and q (l ) > q ∗ are referred to as non-full
support equilibria, and those with q (m ) =q ∗ for all m ∈ T are referred to as full support
equilibria regardless of whether l = 0 or l > 0. The next lemma provides a partial char-
acterization of the structure of the equilibrium signaling strategy in a non-full support
equilibrium.
L 3. In any non-full support equilibrium, (i) Tl 3 l , (ii) Tm = {m } if m ∈ T and
m > l , (iii) min Tm ≥ max Tm+1 for all m < l , (iv) T = ∪m≤l Tm , and (v) q (m ) = 1 and
qˆ (m ) = 0 for all m < l .
The structure of the equilibrium strategy described by Lemma 3 is illustrated in Fig-
ure 1. In the figure, an arrow from node n to m indicates that p (m ; n ) > 0. When the
number of clients of good quality is greater than the minimum number l of good rat-
ings issued, the agency issues a truthful report with probability 1. When the number of
clients of good quality is less than l , the agency exaggerates the number of good quality
clients; indeed it issues more good ratings when there are fewer clients of good qual-
ity.14 This characterization follows from the result in Lemma 2 that the credibility of a
good rating decreases with the total number of good ratings, and the result in Lemma 1
13In a mechanism design setup in which the designer cannot fully commit to an outcome function, Bester
and Strausz (2001) show that any Pareto efficient equilibrium allocation can be achieved with an equilib-
rium in which each type reports truthfully with positive probability. Their result requires messages to be
cheap talk in a signaling setting such as the present model where there is no commitment at all, and there-
fore it does not apply here.
14When the number of clients of good quality is equal to l , the agency may tell the truth in equilibrium,
or it may randomize between issuing l or issuing more than l good ratings (as depicted in Figure 1).
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that the agency has a stronger incentive to inflate to a more credible signal when there
are more clients of good quality. Part (iv) of Lemma 3 establishes that in any non-full
support equilibrium the aggregate support of the equilibrium strategy, T , satisfies the
threshold property that all signals m ≥ l are sent with positive probability. Finally, part
(v) of the lemma specifies a unique set of out-of-equilibriums beliefs q (m ) and qˆ (m ) for
m 6∈ T that satisfy the refinement. It is established by showing that if the agency finds it
weakly optimal to send an out-of-equilibrium signal m < l when there are n 6= m good
quality clients, then the signal is strictly optimal when there are exactly m good quality
clients.
The main result of this section is Proposition 1 below. Since the proof in the Ap-
pendix is rather involved, it is useful here to describe the main steps. We start by show-
ing that the restrictions imposed by Lemma 3 on the structure of Tn in each state n > 0,
together with the necessary equilibrium conditions that there are no profitable devia-
tions, result in certain iterative constraints on the equilibrium reporting strategy p (m ; n )
given the reporting strategies in states n + 1, . . . , N (Definition A.1 and Lemma A.1).
Next we show that, given the reporting strategies in state n = 1, . . . , N , all the equilib-
rium conditions can be satisfied by choosing the value of p (m ; 0) appropriately for each
m = 0, . . . , N , and an equilibrium obtains when such values satisfy
∑
p (m ; 0) = 1 (Defi-
nition A.2 and Lemma A.2). Then, we show that the set of reporting strategies for state
1, . . . , N satisfying the necessary conditions for an equilibrium is closed and connected
(Lemmas A.3 and A.4). In the final step of the proof we show that the set of values p (m ; 0)
that completes the equilibrium conditions has the property that
∑
p (m ; 0) is continu-
ous over the collection of reporting strategies in state 1, . . . , N satisfying the necessary
equilibrium conditions (Lemma A.5). We use this property to establish that an infla-
tionary equilibrium always exists, and there is a non-full support equilibrium with l > 0
if q ∗ < 1−pi0.
P 1. An inflationary equilibrium exists under centralized rating. Further, a
non-full support equilibrium exists if q ∗ < 1−pi0.
The condition for the existence of a non-full support equilibrium has a simple in-
terpretation.15 If the likelihood pi0 that there is no client of good quality is sufficiently
small, then by inflating exclusively in the state when there are no good clients, it is not
possible to drive down the market beliefs q (m ) to q ∗ for each positive number of good
ratings m . In this case, a randomization strategy p (m ; n ) with non-full support and
p (0; 0) = 0 is credible. Further, more probability mass from low states (small numbers of
good quality clients) may be credibly distributed to higher states through the random-
ization described in the proof of Proposition 1, leading to a higher threshold l . Recall
that a non-full support equilibrium exists under individual rating if and only if q ∗ < pi,
which implies q ∗ < 1−pi0. Thus, correlated randomization under centralized rating can
allow the agency to credibly apply a non-full support signaling strategy and achieve a
15The proof of Proposition 1 considers only one particular kind of full support equilibrium, with l = 0
and p (n ; n ) = 1 for all n > 1. There are typically multiple equilibria with l = 0 and q (m ) = q ∗, and they can
also coexist with a non-full support equilibrium.
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higher average level of credibility, when independent randomization under individual
rating implies that the credibility of good ratings is fixed at q ∗.
The construction of our inflationary equilibrium in Proposition 1 applies to any
prior distribution of the client qualities. This is in contrast to the equilibrium construc-
tion under decentralized rating in the next section, which relies on a natural correlation
structure of the quality distribution. We conclude this section by pointing out that the
equilibrium structure under centralized rating generally depends both on the incentive
structure as represented by properties of the payoff functions and on the correlation
structure of the quality distribution, and these two factors can be disentangled only in
special cases. For example, the sufficient condition for a non-full support inflationary
equilibrium in Proposition 1 depends on the quality distribution captured by the prob-
ability pi0 and on the incentive to inflate represented by q ∗. Under reasonable specifi-
cations of the correlation structure, an increase in quality correlation increases pi0 and
thus makes it harder to satisfy the condition for fixed q ∗. At the other end, the necessary
and sufficient condition for the existence of an equilibrium with l = N is given by
(N −1)U (G , g , 1)+U (B ,b , 0)≤ (N −1)U (G , g ,pi)+U (B , g ,pi),
since from the proof of Proposition 1 the incentive of state N − 1 not to deviate from
reporting N to reporting N−1 determines the equilibrium. Whether the above condition
holds depends only on the incentive structure and pi, not on the correlation structure.
More generally, the effects of the incentive structure and the quality correlation on the
equilibrium structure cannot be studied separately.16 In Section 5, we use a specific
model of the correlation structure to give a definitive characterization of the effects of
correlation when the number of clients is arbitrarily large.
4. D : A    
Under decentralized rating, rating information is shared among all markets, as under
centralized rating, but each client is rated by a self-interested rater of the agency with
no access to the quality information of other clients.17 We implicitly assume that as
an alternative to centralized rating, the agency can limit the information about client
quality available to each rater to the single client that the rater is assigned to, and at
16Examples can be constructed in which an increase in quality correlation can either increase or de-
crease the equilibrium threshold. Details are available in a supplementary file on the journal website,
http://econtheory.org/supp/370/supplement.pdf.
17The two features of decentralized rating, namely the restricted information and independent payoffs,
that set it apart from centralized rating, are jointly responsible for our comparison results regarding these
two rating schemes. It is possible to consider a hybrid model in which the state vector is observed by all
raters, but each rater maximizes its own payoff. In such a model an inflationary equilibrium is given by
{p (n )} such that for each n a rater with a bad quality client inflates with probability p (n ), and {q (m )} such
that each client rated g is believed to be good with probability q (m ) when the total number of clients
rated g is m . In contrast to the results we establish below, in such a hybrid model q (m ) is not necessarily
monotone in m and it is always true that for every realized n the incentives to issue a good rating are
stronger for a rater with a good quality client than for one with a bad quality client. The analysis of the
model is beyond the scope of this paper.
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the same time tie the incentive of the rater to the agency’s payoff from that client. As
pointed out in the introduction, a decentralized rating scheme may also be thought of as
a decentralized market structure in which each rater represents an independent rating
agency. In terms of the strategy space, decentralized rating is the same as individual
rating, as only independent randomization across clients is feasible. If the underlying
client qualities are independently distributed, decentralized rating produces the same
equilibrium outcome as does individual rating. However, since ratings information is
shared among all markets, when the underlying qualities are correlated, each market
can use the other ratings to make inferences about the quality of its own client.
In this section we construct an inflationary equilibrium under decentralized rat-
ing. Unlike the case of centralized rating, the analysis of decentralized rating requires a
model of quality correlation across clients. In Definition 1 below, we give precise formu-
lations for positive and negative correlations among client qualities. These formulations
allow us to give sharp characterizations of inflationary equilibria: under positive (nega-
tive) correlation each rater expects a greater (lower) number of good ratings conditional
on G than conditional on B , in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance, and the
credibility of a good rating is increasing (decreasing) in the total number of good ratings
issued. The main result of this section establishes the existence of a symmetric inflation-
ary equilibrium under decentralized rating, and a necessary and sufficient condition for
a full support equilibrium. It turns out that this condition is identical to the condition
under individual rating. We postpone to the next section a discussion of how in a de-
centralized scheme the rating agency can gain in credibility under correlated qualities
and therefore become better off relative to individual rating.
Define a random variable X i , i = 1, . . . , N , such that X i = 1 if Si = G and X i = 0 if
Si = B . Let f (X1, . . . , XN ) represent the joint probability mass function of the random
vector X = (X1, . . . , XN ).
D 1. We say that X is multivariate totally positive of order 2 (MTP2) if, for all
x , y ∈ {0, 1}N ,
f (x ∨ y ) f (x ∧ y )≥ f (x ) f (y ),
where x ∨ y = (max{x1, y1}, . . . , max{xN , yN }) and x ∧ y = (min{x1, y1}, . . . , min{xN , yN }).
We say that X is multivariate reverse rule of order 2 (MRR2) if the inequality is reversed.
The definition of MTP2 is the same as log-supermodularity, also referred to as affili-
ation. It is a commonly used concept of positive dependence among random variables
in the statistics literature (see, for example, Joe 1997) and in the auction literature (see,
for example, Milgrom and Weber 1982). Similarly, MRR2 can be used to capture the
idea of negative dependence among random variables. These dependence concepts
are stronger than the notion of positive or negative “quadrant dependence” used by
Lehmann (1966).
We focus on symmetric inflationary equilibria in which for each i = 1, . . . , N , the
common signaling strategy satisfies Pr[s i = g |Si =G ] = 1 and Pr[s i = g |Si = B ] = p for
some p ∈ [0, 1].18 Define the random variable Yi , i = 1, . . . , N , such that Yi = 1 if s i = g
18In the proof of Proposition 2 below, we use Assumption 2 to establish that the indifference condition
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and Yi = 0 if s i =b . Also let Zi =
∑
j 6=i X j and Z˜i =
∑
j 6=i Yj .
Fix some i = 1, . . . , N . For each m = 1, . . . , N , let r G (m ) be the probability of a total
number m of good ratings conditional on Si =G and s i = g :
r G (m ) = Pr[Z˜i = m −1 |X i = 1, Yi = 1].
Similarly, let
r B (m ) = Pr[Z˜i = m −1 |X i = 0, Yi = 1].
Note that r G (0) = r B (0) = 0. Intuitively, for any fixed p , under MTP2 each individual rater
expects to find more good ratings when the quality of his own client is good than when
it is bad, while the reverse is true under MRR2. This idea is formalized in the following
lemma.
L 4. In any inflationary equilibrium, {r G (m )} first-order stochastically dominates
{r B (m )} under MTP2; the reverse is true under MRR2.
Given any inflationary equilibrium, the beliefs q (m ), m = 1, . . . , N , are given by
q (m ) = Pr[X i = 1 | Yi = 1,Z˜i = m −1].
Let β (t , k , p ) represent the probability of k successes out of t Bernoulli trials with inde-
pendent probability of success p ; that is,
β (t , k , p ) =

t
k

p k (1−p )t−k .
Then, q (m ) can be written more explicitly as
q (m ) =
∑m
n=0pinβ (N −n , m −n , p )n
m
∑m
n=0pinβ (N −n , m −n , p )
. (6)
This formula is valid as long as the denominator is strictly positive, which happens if
p < 1. We refer to an inflationary equilibrium with p < 1 as a full support equilibrium.
L 5. In any full support inflationary equilibrium, q (m ) is increasing in m under
MTP2 and is decreasing in m under MRR2.
This result is quite intuitive. In an inflationary equilibrium the perception of a good
rating depends on the total number of good ratings in all markets: the perception im-
proves with more good ratings when the client qualities are positively correlated, and
it deteriorates when the qualities are negatively correlated. We are now ready to use
Lemmas 4 and 5 to establish existence of an inflationary equilibrium. Note that in any
inflationary equilibrium, qˆ (m ) = 0 for all m = 0, . . . , N −1.
between g and b under B is sufficient to imply truth-telling under G . But this result presumes the signaling
structure of inflationary equilibria. The single crossing condition of Assumption 2 is generally insufficient
to rule out deflationary strategies.
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P 2. There exists an inflationary equilibrium under decentralized rating. Fur-
ther, if pi<q ∗, there is a full support inflationary equilibrium.
P. A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a full support infla-
tionary equilibrium is that there exists p ∈ (0, 1) such that (i) s i = g is weakly preferred
to s i =b if Si =G :
N∑
m=1
r G (m )U (G , g ,q (m ))≥U (G ,b , 0)
and (ii) s i = g and s i =b yield the same expected payoff if Si = B :
N∑
m=1
r B (m )U (B , g ,q (m )) =U (B ,b , 0). (7)
Under MTP2, Lemma 4 states that {r G (m )} first-order stochastically dominates {r B (m )},
while Lemma 5 states that q (m ) is increasing m . Therefore,
N∑
m=1
r G (m )U (G , g ,q (m ))≥
N∑
m=1
r B (m )U (G , g ,q (m )).
It follows from Assumption 2 that condition (ii) implies condition (i). Under MRR2,
{r B (m )} first-order stochastically dominates {r G (m )} while q (m ) is decreasing m , so
again condition (ii) implies condition (i) by Assumption 2. Now, consider the indiffer-
ence condition (ii). If p = 0, we have q (m ) = 1 for all m = 1, . . . , N . By Assumption 3,
N∑
m=1
r B (m )U (B , g ,q (m ))>U (B ,b , 0)
when p = 0. If p = 1, we have q (N ) =
∑
n pin n/N = pi and the left-hand-side of con-
dition (ii) becomes U (B , g ,pi). Under Assumption 2, the refinement implies that the
out-of-equilibrium belief qˆ (N −1) is equal to 0. Thus, if U (B , g ,pi)<U (B ,b , 0), or equiv-
alently pi < q ∗, then by the intermediate value theorem there exists p ∈ (0, 1) such that
the equilibrium condition (ii) is satisfied, and hence there is a full support inflationary
equilibrium. If instead pi ≥ q ∗, with the out-of-equilibrium belief qˆ (N − 1) set to 0, g is
weakly preferred to b under quality B , implying that g is strictly preferred to b under G .
We thus have a non-full support equilibrium with p = 1. 
The condition for the existence of a full support inflationary equilibrium is identi-
cal to the condition for the existence of the unique full support inflationary equilibrium
under individual rating. This is perhaps not surprising, because the only difference be-
tween decentralized rating and individual rating is informational, in that the market for
each client observes the ratings for other clients as well as its own and can use these
ratings to make inferences about the quality of the client it cares about. Such a dif-
ference is not relevant in a non-full support equilibrium of decentralized rating, as the
markets always observe a total of N good ratings. The informational difference between
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decentralized rating and individual rating is similarly irrelevant with independent client
qualities. In that case, we have pin = β (N , n ,pi) for each n = 0, . . . , N . Then, for each
m = 1, . . . , N , direct calculations reveal that
q (m ) =
∑m
n=1(pi/(1−pi)p )n (1/((m −n )!(n −1)!))
m
∑m
n=0(pi/(1−pi)p )n (1/((m −n )!n !)
=
pi
pi+(1−pi)p .
Thus, under independence, decentralized rating reduces to individual rating.
The equilibrium probability of ratings inflation is determined by the indifference
condition (7). Generally both the incentive structure as represented by the payoff func-
tion U (B , g , ·) and the entire client quality distribution affect the equilibrium behav-
ior. As under centralized rating, increasing quality correlation does not always have the
same effects on the equilibrium probability of inflation. In the next section, using a spe-
cific model of the correlation structure and considering the limit case when the number
of clients is arbitrarily large, we can characterize the effects of correlation on the equi-
librium behavior.
5. C  : C  
A comparison between centralized rating and decentralized rating in terms of the equi-
librium credibility of good ratings and the ex ante payoffs to the agency generally de-
pends on the the underlying correlation structure. In Proposition 1, we establish that
there always exists an inflationary equilibrium under centralized rating that does at least
as well as the full support inflationary equilibrium under individual rating. Moreover,
when q ∗ < 1−pi0, there is a non-full support equilibrium that does strictly better. This
condition is rather weak, and is easily satisfied when the qualities are independently dis-
tributed, as long as N is not too small. In contrast, with independently distributed quali-
ties, the unique inflationary equilibrium under decentralized rating is payoff-equivalent
to the full support inflationary equilibrium under individual rating. Thus, we expect
centralized rating to dominate decentralized rating for the agency when there is weak
correlation among the qualities.
The next set of results shows that both the equilibrium credibility of good ratings
and the ex ante payoff to the agency under decentralized rating improve relative to the
benchmark of individual rating when the qualities are correlated. First, we introduce a
definition of equilibrium credibility of good ratings under decentralized rating. For any
p (the probability of inflating), consider the expression
N∑
n=0
npin
Npi
N∑
m=n
β (N −n , m −n , p )q (m ). (8)
This expression may be thought of as an average measure of credibility of good ratings
under decentralized rating, as the credibility of a single given good rating depends on
the total number of good ratings. It is an average across states, with each state weighted
both by the prior probability of the state and by the number of good quality clients in
the state. Under individual rating, the same expression (8) applies, but q (m ) is constant
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and equal to q because the markets are separate. Since
∑N
m=n β (N−n , m−n , p ) = 1, the
above definition of credibility is consistent with the definition given under individual
rating. Further, if we replace β (N −n , m −n , p ) with p (m ; n ) in (8), we have a measure
of credibility under centralized rating.
Under decentralized rating, as under individual rating, the definition (8) of credi-
bility, and correspondingly the expression with p (m ; n ) replacing β (N −n , m −n , p ) for
centralized rating, corresponds one-to-one with the average expected loss of the N mar-
kets, and one-to-one with the expected average marginal value of information provided
by the ratings in equilibrium. To see this, note that the total expected loss in equilibrium
is given by
N∑
n=0
pin
N∑
m=n
β (N −n , m −n , p )(n (1−q (m ))2 +(m −n )q 2(m )).
From equation (6) we have
m∑
n=0
β (N −n , m −n , p )q (m )m =
m∑
n=0
pinβ (N −n , m −n , p )n ,
and therefore by equation (1) the total loss is equal to Npi(1−Q), where Q is our credi-
bility measure given by equation (8). Recall that the average expected loss in a full sup-
port equilibrium under individual rating is pi(1−q ∗), and is pi(1−pi) in the absence of
any ratings information. Thus, the credibility measure given by (8) corresponds one-to-
one with the expected average marginal value of information provided by the ratings in
equilibrium.
To compare equilibrium credibility between decentralized rating and individual rat-
ing, we first note that
r G (m ) =
N∑
n=1
Pr[Z˜i = m −1 |X i = 1, Yi = 1,Zi = n −1]Pr[Zi = n −1 |X i = 1, Yi = 1]
=
m∑
n=1
β (N −n , m −n , p ) n
N
pin
pi
.
Hence the credibility measure is simply
N∑
n=0
npin
Npi
N∑
m=n
β (N −n , m −n , p )q (m ) =
N∑
m=1
r G (m )q (m ).
Thus, the average measure of the credibility of good ratings under decentralized rating is
equal to the market belief expected by a rater with a good quality client. Next, recall that
under individual rating, the market’s belief upon observing g is given bypi/(pi+(1−pi)p )
if p is the probability that rating g is issued under quality B . The next lemma captures
the idea that for any probability of ratings inflation, under decentralized rating corre-
lation across client qualities imposes a discipline on incentives to inflate by making it
harder for each individual rater to fool its own market.
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L 6. Under decentralized rating, for any p < 1,
N∑
m=1
r B (m )q (m )≤ pi
pi+(1−pi)p .
This result is the key to our comparison results below. Under decentralized rating
the weighted average of the market belief conditional on a bad quality client is lower
than the market belief under individual rating for the same probability of rating infla-
tion. That is, a rater that issues an inflated rating on a bad quality client expects on
average a less favorable market belief under either positive or negative correlation than
when qualities are statistically independent. The intuition is that under either positive
correlation (MTP2) or negative correlation (MRR2), for the rater with a bad quality client,
the weights are smaller for higher market beliefs q , so that the weighted average is lower
than the average when the qualities are independently distributed for independent ran-
domizations with the same probability of inflation p . For example, under positive cor-
relation, a higher market belief q is associated with a greater number of good ratings,
but since a rater with a bad quality client expects statistically fewer good quality clients
and thus fewer good ratings, a higher market belief receives a smaller weight.
Our first comparison result is that when U (B , g ,q ) is weakly concave in q , then at any
full support inflationary equilibrium under decentralized rating, the equilibrium proba-
bility of inflation is lower than the full support equilibrium probability of inflation under
individual rating.19 Furthermore, under the same concavity condition, the equilibrium
credibility is higher under decentralized rating than it is under individual rating.
P 3. Suppose U (B , g ,q ) is concave in q. In any full support inflationary equi-
librium under decentralized rating, the probability of inflation is lower and the credibility
is higher than in the full support inflationary equilibrium under individual rating.
P. In a full support inflationary equilibrium, for each i = 1, . . . , N , we must have
the indifference condition between s i = g and s i =b . This condition gives
N∑
m=1
r B (m )U (B , g ,q (m )) =U (B , g ,q ∗). (9)
Since U (B , g ,q ) is concave in q , we have
U

B , g ,
N∑
m=1
r B (m )q (m )

≥U (B , g ,q ∗). (10)
It then follows from Lemma 6 that
U (B , g ,pi/(pi+(1−pi)p ))≥U (B , g ,q ∗),
19This comparison between equilibrium probabilities of inflation under decentralized and individual
rating holds so long as the function is not too convex.
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where p is the equilibrium probability of inflation. Comparing this inequality to equa-
tion (5) in a full support inflationary equilibrium under individual rating, we immedi-
ately obtain that the equilibrium probability of inflation is lower under decentralized
rating than it is under individual rating.
By Lemmas 4 and 5, {r G (m )} first-order stochastically dominates {r B (m )} and q (m )
is increasing under MTP2, while {r B (m )} stochastically dominates {r B (m )} and q (m ) is
decreasing under MRR2. In either case, we have
N∑
m=1
r G (m )q (m )≥
N∑
m=1
r B (m )q (m ).
From inequality (10) we then have
N∑
m=1
r G (m )q (m )≥q ∗,
implying that the equilibrium credibility is higher under decentralized rating. 
For welfare comparison between decentralized rating and individual rating, we say
that U (B , g , ·) is “more concave” than U (G , g , ·) if there is a weakly concave function H
such that U (B , g ,q ) = H (U (G , g ,q )). We have a second comparison result, as follows.
P 4. Suppose U (B , g ,q ) is more concave in q than U (G , g ,q ). Then, the
agency’s payoff in a full support inflationary equilibrium under decentralized rating is
higher than it is in the full support inflationary equilibrium under individual rating.
P. If U (B , g ,q ) is more concave in q than U (G , g ,q ), the indifference condition (9)
implies
N∑
m=1
r B (m )U (G , g ,q (m ))≥U (G , g ,q ∗).
Under MTP2, {r G (m )} first-order stochastically dominates {r B (m )} and q (m ) is increas-
ing, and so
N∑
m=1
r G (m )U (G , g ,q (m ))≥U (G , g ,q ∗).
Under MRR2, q (m ) is decreasing but {r B (m )} stochastically dominates {r B (m )}, so
again the inequality is true. 
Under decentralized rating each client i is exposed to a greater risk when Si = G
than it is under individual rating, because of the uncertainty regarding the ratings of
other clients. However, the beliefs are more favorable under G than they are under B
in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. Thus, welfare improves as long as the
agency is not too much more risk-averse when Si =G than when Si = B .
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Since the strategy space under decentralized rating is the same as it is under individ-
ual rating, the above results show that the gains in credibility and welfare under decen-
tralized rating come from sharing ratings information among the markets. We expect
that the gains are larger when the correlation is stronger. Indeed, the next proposition
establishes that when the correlation across client qualities is almost perfect, there is
a limit inflationary equilibrium with “truth-telling,” i.e., the equilibrium probability of
inflation converges to 0. Let {pik0 , . . . ,pikN } be a sequence of probability distributions that
satisfy MTP2, such that (i) limk→∞
∑N−1
n=1 pi
k
n = 0 and (ii) limk→∞pikN /(pikN +pik0 )< q ∗. The
first condition means that the states become almost perfectly positively correlated as k
becomes arbitrarily large. The second condition guarantees that there exists no pooling
equilibrium with p (N ; n ) = 1 for all n when k is large.
P 5. Under decentralized rating, truth-telling is a limit inflationary equilib-
rium when k goes to infinity.
P. Equation (7) is necessary and sufficient for an inflationary equilibrium under
decentralized rating. As in the proof of Proposition 2, for p = 0, the left-hand side of
(7) is strictly larger than the right-hand side for any k . Next, for all p > 0, the limit of
left-hand side as k goes to infinity is strictly less than
p N−1U (B , g , 1)+ (1−p N−1)U (B , g , 0).
This is because in the limit when the correlation is perfect, from equation (6) we have
q (m ) = 0 for all m <N , while q (N )< 1. Let p˜ be the value of p that solves
p N−1U (B , g , 1)+ (1−p N−1)U (B , g , 0) =U (B ,b , 0).
Then, for all 0< p < p˜ , the limit of the left-hand side of (7) as k goes to infinity is strictly
smaller than the right-hand side. Hence, for each p there exists k (p ) such that for all k >
k (p ) there is an inflationary equilibrium with the probability of inflation strictly between
0 and p . Since this construction of p˜ and k (p ) holds for all p , by taking p arbitrarily
close to 0 we can establish truth-telling (i.e., p = 0) as a limit point of a sequence of
inflationary equilibria for k going to infinity. 
While strong correlation enhances credibility and improves welfare under decen-
tralized rating, the opposite is true under centralized rating. To see this, note that the
conditions made on the convergence of the sequence of the distributions pik imply that
in the limit of k going to infinity, there is no non-full support equilibrium by Proposi-
tion 1. Thus, centralized rating cannot improve upon individual rating when correla-
tion is almost perfect. Correlation of the underlying qualities reduces the manipulation
room under both decentralized rating and centralized rating. Under decentralized rat-
ing the constraint imposed by correlation makes it harder for a rater to fool the market
with a good rating, and forces the individual raters to tone down the exaggeration. This
then results in a greater ex ante payoff relative to individual rating. In contrast, strong
correlation makes correlated randomization under centralized rating less effective.
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5.1 Correlation, credibility, and welfare: An example
For an analysis involving non-extreme values of correlation, the notion of quality cor-
relation is ambiguous, and a more specific description of the multivariate probability
distribution is required. We illustrate how quality correlation affects the equilibrium be-
havior and the welfare properties of centralized rating versus decentralized rating using
the following simple model of correlation. With probability α, the client qualities are
perfectly correlated, in which case pi is the probability that all clients have good quality
and 1−pi is the probability that all have bad quality; with probability 1−α, the client
qualities are independent, and pi is the probability that each client is of good quality. In
this model, the quality distribution satisfies MTP2, and the parameter α measures the
degree of correlation. When the number of clients is arbitrarily large, the quality distri-
bution converges to three mass points: with probability αpi all clients have good quality,
with probability α(1−pi) no client has good quality, and with the remaining probabil-
ity 1−α a fraction arbitrarily close to pi of all clients have good quality. We analyze the
limit case of N going to infinity for centralized rating and decentralized rating separately
before comparing the two schemes.
Centralized rating We assume that q ∗ < 1−α(1−pi); otherwise, in the limit case the
equilibrium outcome is equivalent to the full support equilibrium under individual rat-
ing with all beliefs given by q ∗. Further, we assume that for all µ∈ (pi, 1],
piU (G , g , 1)+ (µ−pi)U (B ,b , 0)>piU  G , g ,pi/µ+(µ−pi)U  B , g ,pi/µ . (11)
In words, the agency strictly prefers rating truthfully to issuing any higher fraction µ of
good ratings when it is common knowledge that with probability 1 a fraction pi of the
clients is of good quality.20
C 1. There is a unique limit threshold fraction λ such that when all clients have bad
quality the limit equilibrium message λ is either equal to pi or strictly below it.
Using equation (11), in the appendix (Lemma A.6) we formally state and establish that
in any equilibrium there is approximate truth-telling as long as it is not the case that
all clients have bad quality. Intuitively, for any α < 1, because in the limit the proba-
bility mass of all states other than n = 0 and n = N is concentrated around Npi, if in
these states the agency issues a fraction µ of good ratings bounded away from pi, then
the market belief upon observing µ cannot exceed pi/µ in the limit. This inflation also
implies that the market belief upon observing a fraction close to pi of good ratings ap-
proaches 1, which is inconsistent with equilibrium by condition (11). As a result, the
20If this assumption is violated, truth-telling does not obtain even when the qualities are independent
(α = 0) and the number of clients is arbitrarily large, so that the market beliefs depend on the fraction of
observed good ratings, and not on the signaling strategy. In this case, ratings inflation occurs for reasons
unrelated to the issue of credibility. If the markets could jointly commit to their actions, then truth-telling
in the limit of α= 0 and N going to infinity can easily be obtained, by having the markets assign the belief
of 1 to exactly a fraction pi of all clients and a belief of 0 to the rest. This observation is an example of the
general result given by Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007), in which case assumption (11) is not needed.
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equilibrium threshold fraction l N /N cannot be strictly above pi in the limit. Which case
arises depends only on the incentives to inflate when all client qualities are bad.
Case 1: λ=pi. If
U (B , g ,pi)>piU (B , g , 1)+ (1−pi)U (B ,b , 0), (12)
then in state n = 0 the agency strictly prefers issuing all good ratings to pooling with
states close to Npi, implying λ = pi. In this case, changes in α have no effect on the
equilibrium behavior, but since the agency reports truthfully when there is a fraction pi
of good quality clients, the equilibrium outcome approaches truth-telling as α goes to
0.21
Case 2: λ < pi. If the inequality (12) is reversed, then under the beliefs in (12), in
state n = 0 the agency strictly prefers to pool with states close to Npi. This is not an
equilibrium, as the beliefs upon observing the messages close to Npi fall below 1, lead-
ing to deviations in states close to Npi, because by Lemma 3 the belief upon observing
out-of-equilibrium messages just below Npi is 1. Instead, in state n = 0 the agency is
indifferent among issuing three different fractions of good ratings, λ, pi, and 1, and dis-
tributes the probability massα(1−pi) between the latter two fractions. The value ofλ<pi
and the probability mass θ > 0 assigned to the fraction pi are uniquely determined by
the indifference conditions:22
piU
 
B , g ,(1−α)/(1−α+α(1−pi)θ )+(1−pi)U (B ,b , 0)
=λU (B , g , 1)+ (1−λ)U (B ,b , 0) =U  B , g ,pi/(pi+(1−pi)(1−θ )) . (13)
In this case, asα increases, the equilibrium value of θ decreases, because a greater prob-
ability mass α(1− pi) in state n = 0 to be allocated between the fraction of pi and the
fraction of 1 depresses the market belief upon observing a fraction pi of good ratings but
not the belief upon observing all good ratings. As a result, the equilibrium belief upon
observing all good ratings decreases, implying that the equilibrium threshold fraction λ
must decrease to restore the indifference in state n = 0 between issuing all good ratings
and issuing a fraction λ of good ratings. Thus, as in the case of λ = pi, a greater degree
of correlation reduces all equilibrium beliefs. Regardless of α, centralized rating strictly
improves on individual rating: if q ∗ ∈ (pi, 1−α(1−pi)), then we have a full support equi-
librium with belief q ∗ under individual rating while a non-full support equilibrium with
beliefs strictly larger than q ∗ under centralized rating; if instead q ∗ < pi, then we have a
non-full support equilibrium under individual rating with belief equal to pi, while under
centralized rating the beliefs are uniformly higher because the belief upon observing all
good ratings is strictly larger than pi for θ > 0.
21The inequality (12) implies that q ∗ < pi, and therefore under individual rating we have a non-full sup-
port equilibrium. Since in state n = 0 the agency issues all good ratings with probability 1, centralized
rating yields the same payoff in state n = 0 and state n = N as under individual rating. The comparison
between the schemes depends only on what happens when there is a fraction pi of good quality clients.
22The value of λ determined by these conditions is strictly positive because by assumption q ∗ <
1−α(1−pi).
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Decentralized rating We assume that q ∗ > pi; otherwise, the equilibrium has non-full
support as under individual rating. In a full support equilibrium, the equilibrium prob-
ability of inflation is p < 1, which implies that the markets can perfectly infer the state
from the realized fraction of good ratings. From each individual rater’s point of view,
conditional on having a bad quality client, the probability that the state is n = 0 is
α(1−pi)/(1−αpi), and with the complementary probability there is a fraction arbitrarily
close to pi of good quality clients.
Case 1: p = 0. If
α(1−pi)
1−αpi U (B , g , 0)+
1−α
1−αpiU (B , g , 1)<U (B ,b , 0), (14)
then in the limit we have p = 0 and truth-telling. An increase in αmakes this inequality
more likely to hold, but otherwise has no effect on the equilibrium behavior.
Case 2: p > 0. If the opposite of (14) holds, we have p > 0 in the limit and it uniquely
satisfies
α(1−pi)
1−αpi U (B , g , 0)+
1−α
1−αpiU
 
B , g ,pi/(pi+(1−pi)p )=U (B ,b , 0). (15)
As α increases, the equilibrium value of p decreases. This is because with a greater con-
ditional probability that all clients have bad quality, a good rating becomes less credible,
and the probability of inflation must decrease to restore the indifference condition. As
a result, an increase in α improves the equilibrium belief upon inferring that there is a
fractionpi of good quality clients. When α becomes large, the indifference condition can
no longer hold, and we have p = 0 and truth-telling in equilibrium. On the other hand,
when α goes to 0, the equilibrium value of p is such that the equilibrium belief upon
inferring that the fraction of good quality clients is pi converges to q ∗, which gives the
same outcome as individual rating.
Centralized vs. decentralized rating To make payoff and welfare comparisons between
centralized and decentralized rating schemes asα varies, we note that under either indi-
vidual rating or truth-telling, the payoff to the agency and the payoff loss to the markets
as represented by our credibility measure (8) are invariant to α. Under centralized rat-
ing, if q ∗ ≥ 1−α(1−pi), the equilibrium payoff is piU (G , g ,q ∗)+ (1−pi)U (B ,b , 0) and the
credibility is q ∗, the same as in the full support equilibrium under individual rating. If
instead q ∗ < 1−α(1−pi), the equilibrium payoff to the agency is
α(1−pi)U  B , g ,pi/(pi+(1−pi)(1−θ ))+αpiU  G , g ,pi/(pi+(1−pi)(1−θ ))
+(1−α) piU  G , g , (1−α)/(1−α+α(1−pi)θ )+(1−pi)U (B ,b , 0)
and the credibility measure (8) becomes
(1−α) 1−α
1−α+α(1−pi)θ +α
pi
pi+(1−pi)(1−θ ) ,
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where θ = 0 if (12) is satisfied, and is given by (13) otherwise. Under decentralized rating,
if q ∗ ≤ pi, the equilibrium payoff is piU (G , g ,pi) + (1−pi)U (B , g ,pi), and the credibility is
pi, the same as in the non-full support equilibrium under individual rating. If instead
q ∗ >pi, then the equilibrium payoff to the agency is
pi

1−α
1−α(1−pi)U
 
G , g ,pi/(pi+(1−pi)p )+ αpi
1−α(1−pi)U (G , g , 1)

+(1−pi)U (B ,b , 0)
and the credibility measure becomes
1−α
1−α(1−pi)
pi
pi+(1−pi)p +
αpi
1−α(1−pi) ,
where p is the equilibrium probability of inflation given by (15).
Comparison case 1: q ∗ ≤ pi. In this case, decentralized rating is equivalent to in-
dividual rating, but centralized rating does better both in terms of payoff to the agency
and credibility. When α approaches 0, centralized rating achieves the first best; as α in-
creases, both the payoff to the agency and the credibility of good ratings decrease; and
as α approaches 1, the equilibrium outcome of centralized rating approaches the non-
full support equilibrium of individual rating, at which point centralized rating coincides
with decentralized rating.
Comparison case 2: q ∗ > pi. In this case, as α approaches 0, again centralized rat-
ing achieves the first best while decentralized rating approaches the full support equi-
librium of individual rating. As α increases, the payoff to the agency and credibility
decrease under centralized rating but increase under decentralized rating. When α is
sufficiently large, centralized rating becomes equivalent to the full support equilibrium
of individual rating, while as α approaches 1, decentralized rating achieves the first best
outcome of truth-telling.
6. C 
Providers of information often care about the way their information is used. The de-
sire to create favorable beliefs about its clients may cause a rating agency to inflate its
assessment of the quality of its clients. The exuberant stock recommendations made
during the internet boom and the failure of auditors to raise alerts in a number of re-
cent corporate scandals have heightened the public’s concern about the potential con-
flict of interests inherent in situations where raters are advocates for the rated. Moore
et al. (2005) study this kind of problem and its possible solutions from a variety of per-
spectives. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) study how competition and the concern for
reputation may constrain biased reporting by the mass media. Chan et al. (2007) use a
signaling model to understand why grades in academia tend to be exaggerated. None of
these papers, however, examines how the credibility of ratings can be improved by co-
ordinating or decentralizing the rating decisions, which is the main focus of our paper.
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In the literature on reputational cheap talk, a bad sender type may provide useful
information to the receiver to establish credibility as a good sender type so as to ex-
tract future surplus (Sobel 1985, Benabou and Laroque 1992, Morris 2001, Morgan and
Stocken 2003). This effect arises in a cheap talk game where the sender has private in-
formation on both the relevant state-of-the-world and his personal bias. As a costly sig-
naling model of credibility, our model of individual rating has a single source of private
information. The equilibrium credibility of a good rating is quantifiable in our model
and corresponds one-to-one with the welfare of the rating agency. These features make
our model of credibility a natural benchmark for comparisons with centralized and de-
centralized rating schemes.
This paper is related to the small literature on multi-dimensional signaling (Quinzii
and Rochet 1985, Engers 1987). This literature focuses on the conditions under which
separation of types occurs. Technically, the models in the existing literature are con-
cerned with multi-dimensional private information for the sender and one-dimensional
signals. Our signaling model of centralized rating assumes exchangeability of the com-
ponents of the state vector, so that the private information is the number of good clients,
which is one-dimensional. However, the signal space is multi-dimensional, as a strat-
egy specifies a number of good ratings for each number of good clients. As a result, the
single crossing condition in the benchmark case of individual rating is not completely
effective in either centralized rating or decentralized rating. This feature complicates
the analysis but enriches the comparison analysis for the different schemes of rating.
Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2007) show that in a cheap talk game where a sender and
receiver interact on several unrelated issues, the sender can credibly communicate to
the receiver the ranking of the private signals even if the conflicts between them are too
great to permit credible communication of the signal on any single issue.23 Their result
has the interpretation that bundling independent reports may help information trans-
mission, which is related to our result for centralized rating. However, their result follows
from the observation that the sender has no incentive to deceive the receiver about the
ranking of the signals, while our analysis is based on the coordination of reports in a
costly signaling model.
In the literature on signaling games, a few models involve multiple senders (Bag-
well and Ramey 1991, Hertzendorf and Overgaard 2001). In these models, the senders
know each other’s types and interact with each other directly through their signals. In
contrast, the raters in our model of decentralized rating have private information about
their own types and have no direct interaction except that their signals are jointly used
by the receivers to make inferences about the types of the senders. Our model of decen-
tralized rating is therefore a model of competing signals, rather than a model of com-
peting senders.
23The idea that linking decisions can be payoff-improving appears also in the literature on bundling in
monopoly pricing (Adams and Yellen 1976, McAfee et al. 1989) and incentive design (Maskin and Tirole
1990, Jackson and Sonnenschein 2007).
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A
L 1. (i) For any m ≤ n < n ′ ≤ m ′, if W (m ′; n ) ≥ W (m ; n ) then W (m ′; n ′) >
W (m ; n ′); (ii) for any n < n ′ ≤ m , m ′ and q (m ′) > q (m ), if W (m ′; n ) ≥ W (m ; n ),
then W (m ′; n ′) > W (m ; n ′); and (iii) for any m , m ′ ≤ n ′ < n and qˆ (m ′) > qˆ (m ), if
W (m ′; n )≥W (m ; n ), then W (m ′; n ′)>W (m ; n ′).
P. (i) The difference of differences [W (m ′; n ′)−W (m ; n ′)]− [W (m ′; n )−W (m ; n )]
is (n ′−n ) times
[U (G , g ,q (m ′))−U (G ,b , qˆ (m ))]− [U (B , g ,q (m ′))−U (B ,b , qˆ (m ))],
which is positive by equation (2).
(ii) The difference between W (m ′; n ′)−W (m ; n ′) and W (m ′; n )−W (m ; n ) is (n ′−n )
times
[U (G , g ,q (m ′))−U (G , g ,q (m ))]− [U (B , g ,q (m ′))−U (B , g ,q (m ))],
which is positive by Assumption 2 since q (m ′)>q (m ).
(iii) The difference between W (m ′; n ′)−W (m ; n ′) and W (m ′; n )−W (m ; n ) is (n−n ′)
times
[U (B ,b , qˆ (m ′))−U (B ,b , qˆ (m ))]− [U (G ,b , qˆ (m ′))−U (G ,b , qˆ (m ))],
which is positive by Assumption 2 since q (m ′)>q (m ). 
P  L . Let m 1 = N , and iteratively define m k as the smallest integer such
that {m k , . . . , m k } ⊆ T , and m k+1 as the largest integer smaller than m k such that
m k+1 ∈ T . We have the following claims regarding equilibrium and out-of-equilibrium
beliefs.
1. In any inflationary equilibrium, if q (m )< q ∗ for some m ∈ T and m − 1 ∈ T , then
q (m − 1) < q (m ) < q ∗. Otherwise, W (m − 1; n ) >W (m ; n ) for all n ≤m − 1, and
either m 6∈ T or q (m ) = 1, a contradiction in either case.
2. If q (m ) < q (m ′) for all m , m ′ ∈ {m k , . . . , m k } and m < m ′, then p (n ; n ) < 1 for
all n ∈ {m k , . . . , m k − 1}. Otherwise, W (n ; n ) ≥ W (n + 1; n ) implies W (n ; n ′) >
W (n +1; n ′) for all n ′ < n by part (ii) of Lemma 1, implying that either n +1 6∈ T or
q (n +1) = 1, a contradiction in either case.
3. For any x 6∈ T , if for each k such that m k > x we have q (m ) < q (m ′) < q ∗ for all
m , m ′ ∈ {m k , . . . , m k } and m <m ′, then the out-of-equilibrium belief is qˆ (x ) = 0.
Suppose instead qˆ (x ) > 0. We show that W (x ; n ) ≥ W (tn ; n ) for any n > x and
tn ∈ Tn implies that W (x ; n − 1)>W (tn−1; n − 1) for any tn−1 ∈ Tn−1. An iteration
of this result leads to qˆ (x ) = 0 by the refinement, a contradiction that establishes
the claim. For any n > x , there are two cases. In the first case, either there is
no k with n = m k + 1, which by the previous claim implies that there exists a
tn−1 ∈ Tn−1 such that tn−1 ≥ n , or n = m k + 1 for some k but p (n − 1; n − 1) < 1,
which implies again that there exists tn−1 ∈ Tn−1 such that tn−1 ≥ n . Then, since
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W (x ; n ) ≥ W (tn ; n ), we have W (x ; n ) ≥ W (tn−1; n ) by optimality, which implies
W (x ; n−1)>W (tn−1; n−1) by part (i) of Lemma 1. In the second case, n = m k +1
for some k and p (n − 1; n − 1) = 1. Since qˆ (x )> 0 and qˆ (n − 1) = 0, by part (iii) of
Lemma 1, W (x ; n )≥W (n −1; n ) implies that W (x ; n −1)>W (n −1; n −1).
4. If for some m k > 0 we have q (m ) < q ∗ for all m > m k , then q (m k ) < q ∗. To see
this, suppose that q (m k ) ≥ q ∗. By construction m k + 1 6∈ T and by the previous
claim, qˆ (m k + 1) = 0. Next, for any n ≤ m k and any tn ∈ Tn , W (m k + 1; n ) ≥
W (tn ; n ) implies W (m k + 1; n )≥W (m k ; n ). Since qˆ (m k + 1) = 0, and q (m k )≥ q ∗
by assumption, W (m k + 1; n ) ≥W (m k ; n ) implies q (m k + 1) ≥ q ∗. It follows that
W (m k +1; m k +1)>W (tm k +1; m k +1) for any tm k +1 ∈ Tm k +1. The refinement then
implies q (m k +1) = 1, a contradiction.
Using these four claims, we now establish that in any equilibrium q (m ) ≥ q ∗ for
all m ∈ T . Suppose instead q (m ) < q ∗ for some m ∈ T . Then, q (N ) < q ∗; otherwise,
W (N ; n ) > W (m ; n ) for all n ≤ m , contradicting the assumption that m ∈ T . Claims
1 and 4 above then imply that q (m ) < q ∗ for all m ∈ T and m > 0. If l > 0, we have
W (0; 0) > W (m ; 0) for all m ∈ T regardless of qˆ (0), a contradiction. If l = 0 and 1 ∈
T , we have p (0; 0) = 1 and q (1) = 1, again a contradiction. Finally, if l = 0 and 1 6∈
T , since qˆ (1) = 0 by claim (3) above and q (t1) < q ∗ for any t1 ∈ T1, we have W (1; 1) >
W (t1; 1) whenever W (1; 0) ≥W (0; 0), which implies q (1) = 1 by the refinement, again a
contradiction.
(i) For the first part of the lemma, note that if q (m )> q ∗ for some m > 0 and m ∈ T ,
then W (m ; 0)>W (0; 0). This contradicts the assumption that l = 0. Thus, q (m ) =q ∗ for
all m > 0 such that m ∈ T .
(ii) For the second part, note that if q ∗ ≤ q (m ′) < q (m ) or if q ∗ < q (m ′) = q (m ) for
some m , m ′ ∈ T , and m >m ′, we have W (m ; n )>W (m ′; n ) for all n ≤m ′, contradicting
the assumption that m ′ ∈ T . Thus, it remains to prove that if q (m ) =q ∗ for some m ∈ T ,
then q (m ′) = q ∗ for all m ∈ T and 0 < m ′ < m . To establish this last claim, suppose
q (m ) =q ∗ for some m ∈ T . There are two cases. First suppose m−1∈ T . If q (m−1)>q ∗,
then W (m − 1; n ) >W (m ; n ) for all n ≤m − 1. This implies q (m ) = 1, a contradiction.
Thus q (m − 1) = q ∗. Next suppose m − 1 6∈ T . Let m be the largest signal in T that is
smaller than m . Since q (m ′) = q ∗ for all m ′ ∈ T and m ′ ≥m , we have W (tm+1; m +1) =
W (m ′; m + 1) for any tm+1 ∈ Tm+1. For all n >m + 1, since W (m + 1; n ) ≥W (tn ; n ) for
tn ∈ Tn implies W (m + 1; m + 1) > W (tn ; m + 1) = W (tm+1, m + 1), it follows from the
refinement that qˆ (m + 1) = 0. Given this, if q (m ) > q ∗, then W (m + 1; n ) ≥W (tn ; n ) for
any n ≤m and any tn ∈ Tn implies q (m +1)>q ∗. It then follows that W (m +1; m +1)>
W (tm+1; m + 1), and therefore q (m + 1) = 1 by the refinement, a contradiction. Thus,
q (m ) =q ∗. 
P  L . (i), (ii) Suppose p (m ′; m )> 0 for some m , m ′ ∈ T and m ′ >m ≥ l .
By optimality we have W (m ′; m )−W (m ; m )≥ 0. Since q (m )> q (m ′) by Lemma 2, part
(ii) of Lemma 1 implies W (m ′; n )−W (m ; n ) > 0 and hence p (m ; n ) = 0 for all n < m .
Part (i) of the lemma follows by setting m = l and noting that p (l ; l ) = 0 implies l 6∈ T ,
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a contradiction. Part (ii) follows by noting that for any m ∈ T and m > l , p (m ; m ) < 1
implies that q (m ) = 1, contradicting Lemma 2.
(iii) By optimality W (min Tm ; m )≥W (n ; m ) for all n ≥min Tm . Since from Lemma 2
we have q (min Tm )> q (n ), part (ii) of Lemma 1 implies that W (min Tm ; m ′)>W (n ; m ′)
for all m ′ such that m <m ′ ≤ l ≤min Tm . Hence p (n ; m ′) = 0, and max Tm ′ ≤min Tm .
(iv) Let x > 0 be the largest signal such that x 6∈ T . Note that in any inflationary
equilibrium x <N . We first show by contradiction that qˆ (x ) = 0. This claim follows from
the refinement if W (x ; n ) ≥W (tn ; n ) for any n > x and tn ∈ Tn implies that W (x ;x ) >
W (tx ;x ) for any tx ∈ Tx . To establish the latter claim, note that for any n > x + 1, by
optimality W (x ; n ) ≥ W (tn ; n ) implies that W (x ; n ) ≥ W (x + 1; n ). Since qˆ (x ) > 0 and
qˆ (x + 1) = 0, part (iii) of Lemma 1 implies that W (x ;x + 1) > W (x + 1;x + 1). Since
x +1 ∈ Tx+1 by (i) and (ii) above, we have W (x ;x +1)>W (tx+1;x +1) for all tx+1 ∈ Tx+1,
which by optimality implies W (x ;x + 1) > W (tx ;x + 1). Since tx ≥ x + 1, by part (i) of
Lemma 1, we have W (x ;x )>W (tx ;x ).
Next, we claim that q (x ) = 1. To see this, note that for each n < x and any tn ∈ Tn , by
optimality W (x ; n ) ≥W (tn ; n ) implies W (x ; n ) ≥W (x + 1; n ). Since qˆ (x ) = qˆ (x + 1) = 0,
if W (x ; n ) ≥W (x + 1; n ) then q (x ) > q (x + 1). Since tx ≥ x + 1, from Lemma 2 we have
q (x ) > q (tx ). It then follows from part (ii) of Lemma 1 that W (x ;x ) > W (tx ;x ). By the
refinement, q (x ) = 1. Thus there is no m < x such that m ∈ T .
(v) First, consider qˆ (0). By (ii) and (iii) above, p (N ; 0)> 0; otherwise, q (N ) = 1, which
is a contradiction. For any n > 0 and tn ∈ Tn , if W (0; n ) ≥W (tn ; n ) then by optimality
W (0; n ) ≥W (N ; n ). By part (i) of Lemma 1, we have W (0; 0) >W (N ; 0). It follows from
the refinement that qˆ (0) = 0.
Next, we show that qˆ (m ) = 0 for any m = {1, . . . , l −1}. Suppose instead qˆ (m )> 0. We
show that W (m ; n )≥W (tn ; n ) for any n >m and tn ∈ Tn implies W (m ; m )>W (tm ; m )
for any tm ∈ Tm , which leads to a contradiction by the refinement. First, for any n > l , by
optimality W (m ; n )≥W (tn ; n ) implies W (m ; n )≥W (l ; n ). Since qˆ (m )> 0 and qˆ (l ) = 0,
by part (iii) of Lemma 1, W (m ; l ) >W (l ; l ). Second, for any n such that m < n ≤ l , we
have tm ≥ n . If W (m ; n )≥W (tn ; n ), optimality implies that W (m ; n )≥W (tm ; n ). It then
follows from part (i) of Lemma 1 that W (m ; m )>W (tm ; m ). Combining these two cases,
we have qˆ (m ) = 0, as desired.
Finally, consider q (m ) for any m = {1, . . . , l − 1}. Suppose that W (m ; n ) ≥W (tn ; n )
for some n <m and tn ∈ Tn . By optimality W (m ; n )≥W (tm ; n ), which implies q (m )>
q (tm ) as qˆ (m ) = 0. It then follows from part (ii) of Lemma 1 that W (m ; m )>W (tm ; m ).
By the refinement, q (m ) = 1. 
P  P . Denote by pn a reporting strategy in state n (i.e., the vector
(p (0; n ), . . . , p (N ; n ))), and let Pn be a sequence (pn , . . . , pN ). For a given pn , we use t n
(t n ) to denote the largest (smallest) m such that p (m ; n )> 0. Although P
n is not a com-
plete strategy, we construct the market beliefs under the assumption that p (m ; n ′) = 0
for all m and all n ′ < n and denote it q (m | Pn ). When q (m | Pn ) cannot be obtained us-
ing Bayes’ rule, it is defined to be 1, while qˆ (m |Pn ) is defined to be 0. Finally, we denote
by W (m ; n | Pk ) the expected payoff to the agency that issues m good ratings and has n
clients of good quality when the market beliefs are given by q (m | Pk ) and qˆ (m | Pk ) for
each m = 0, . . . , N .
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D A.1. We say pn for some n > 0 is compatible with l given Pn+1 if it satisfies:
(i) p (n ; n ) = 1 in case n > l ;
(ii) in case n = l : (a) p (m ; n ) = 0 for all m < l ; (b) W (n ; n |Pn ) = W (t ; n |Pn ) for
all n < t < t n ; (c) W (n ; n |Pn ) ≤ W (t n ; n |Pn ) if t n < N ; and (d) p (N ; n ) =
1−∑m<N p (m ; n );
(iii) in case n < l : (a) t n+1 + 1 ≥ t n ≥ t n+1; (b) W (t n ; n |Pn ) = W (t ; n |Pn ) for
all t n < t < t n ; (c) W (t n ; n |Pn ) ≤ W (t n ; n |Pn ) if t n < N ; (d) p (N ; n ) = 1 −∑
m<N p (m ; n ); (e) W (t n ′ − 1; n ′|Pn ) ≤ W (t n ′ ; n ′|Pn ) for all n ≤ n ′ ≤ l if t n <
N ; (f ) W (t n+1; n +1|Pn ) ≥ W (t n ; n + 1|Pn ) if t n > t n ; and (g) W (t n ′ ; n ′|Pn ) =
W (t n ′ ; n ′|Pn ) for all n ′ > n if t n > t n+1.
We say Pn is compatible with l if pk is compatible with l given Pk+1 = (pk+1, . . . , pN )
for each k such that N > k ≥ n , and Pn is compatible if it is compatible with some
l = 0, . . . , N .
L A.1. If P = (p0, . . . , pN ) is the reporting strategy in an equilibrium with threshold
l , then P1 = (p1, . . . , pN ) is compatible with l .
P. We show that, if Pn+1 is compatible with l and P is an equilibrium strategy,
then pn is compatible with l given Pn+1. The lemma then follows from observing that
there is only one way of constructing an equilibrium strategy pN and it is compatible
with all l .
Part (i) of Definition A.1 follows immediately from the definition of equilibrium.
Part (ii). (a) follows immediately from the definition of equilibrium. Next, note that
part (iii) of Lemma 3 implies that in any equilibrium with threshold l and each n ≤ l ,
W (t ; n |Pn ) = W (t ; n ) for all t < t n and W (t n ; n |Pn ) ≥W (t n ; n ). Thus by Lemma 3, (b)
and (c) must hold in equilibrium. (d) is clearly necessary.
Part (iii). (a) follows from part (iii) and (iv) of Lemma 3. The proof of (b), (c), and
(d) is the same as for part (ii) above. Condition (e) is necessary for equilibrium because
W (t n ′−1; n ′|Pn ) = W (t n ′−1; n ′) and W (t n ′ ; n ′|Pn )≥W (t n ′ ; n ′) for all n ≤ n ′ ≤ l . (f ) and
(g) follow because W (m ; n ′|Pn ) = W (m ; n ′) for all n ′ and all m < t n . 
Lemma A.1 establishes that compatibility of P1 is a necessary condition for P =
(p0, P1) to be an equilibrium. However, it is not sufficient since no restriction is imposed
on p0. Next we give a definition of compatibility of a vector p0 = (p (0; 0), . . . , p (N ; 0))
given a compatible P1. This definition ensures that all the equilibrium conditions are
satisfied but does not require
∑
m p (m ; 0) = 1 or p (m ; 0) ≥ 0 for all m = 0, . . . , N , so that
p0 may not be a valid reporting strategy.
D A.2. Given P1 compatible with l , we say that p0 is compatible with P1 if,
when l > 0:
(i) p (m ; 0) = 0 for all m < t 1;
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(ii) p (t 1; 0) is such that W (t n ; n |p0, P1) = W (t n ; n |p0, P1) and W (t n − 1; n |p0, P1) ≤
W (t n ; n |p0, P1), for all n ≤ l ;
(iii) p (m ; 0) for t 1 <m ≤ N satisfies: (a) if p (t 1; 0) > 0, then p (m ; 0) is the value such
that W (t 1; 0|p0, P1) = W (m ; 0|p0, P1); and (b) if p (t 1; 0) = 0, then p (t 1 + 1; 0) sat-
isfies W (t 1; 0|p0, P1)≤W (t 1 +1; 0|p0, P1) and W (t 1; 1|p0, P1)≥W (t 1 +1; 1|p0, P1),
and p (m ; 0) is such that W (t 1 +1; 0|p0, P1) = W (m ; 0|p0, P1) for m > t 1 +1;
and, when l = 0, p (0; 0)∈ [0, 1] and for each m > 0, p (m ; 0) satisfies (iii) with t 1 = 0.
By definition, if P1 is compatible with l and p0 is compatible with P1 we have
W (t n ; n |p0, P1) = W (t ; n |p0, P1)≥W (m ; n |p0, P1),∀n ≤ l , m ≥ l , t n ≤ t ≤ t n . (A.1)
Moreover, for any vector p0 that is not compatible with P1, (A.1) is violated and hence
P = (p0, P1) is not an equilibrium. By Definitions A.1 and A.2, only p (N ; 0) can be neg-
ative in a compatible vector p0 and, in that case p (m ; 0) = 0 for each m < N . Thus,
if
∑
m p (m ; 0) = 1, the vector p0 is a reporting strategy and P = (p0, P
1) satisfies all the
properties of Lemma 3. It follows that P = (p0, P1) is an equilibrium only if p0 is compat-
ible with P1 and
∑
m p (m ; 0) = 1. The following lemma verifies that these two conditions
are also sufficient for an equilibrium.
L A.2. Let P1 = (p1, . . . , pN ) be compatible. Then P = (p0, P1) is an equilibrium if
and only if p0 is compatible with P1 and
∑
m p (m ; 0) = 1.
P. Since (A.1) holds, we need to argue only that (a) given P there are no profitable
deviations to out-of-equilibrium messages and (b) in all states n > l , the agency has no
incentive to deviate from the reporting strategy p (n ; n ) = 1.
(a) The most profitable deviation among out-of-equilibrium signals is always m =
l −1. Part (iii) (e) of Definition A.1 and part (ii) of Definition A.2 imply that
W (l ; l −1)≥W (l −1; l −1), (A.2)
because either t l−1 = l or q (l ) = 1. By part (i) of Lemma 1, (A.2) implies that W (l ; l ) >
W (l − 1; l ), and, since q (l − 1) ≥ q (l ), by (ii) of Lemma 1 it implies that W (l ; n ) ≥
W (l −1; n ) for all n < l − 1. Finally, since W (l ; l ) > W (l − 1; l ) and since W (l ; n )−
W (l − 1; n ) = W (l ; l )−W (l − 1; l ) for all n > l because qˆ (l − 1) = qˆ (l ) = 0, we have
W (l ; n )>W (l −1; n ) for all n > l .
(b) The claim is trivial if l = 0 since in that case p0 compatible with P1 implies that
q (m ) = q ∗ for all m = 1, . . . , N . If P1 is not compatible with l = 0, then q (l )> q ∗ because
either l > 1 and (A.2) holds, or l = 1 and p (l ; l ) < 1, which implies q (l ) = 1. It follows
that q (m )>q (n )>q ∗ for all n >m ≥ l . First we show that W (n ; 0)−W (m ; 0)≥ 0 implies
W (n ; n )−W (m ; n ) ≥ 0. This is trivially true for any m if n = m . Now, the condition
W (n ; 0)−W (m ; 0)≥ 0 is equivalent to
U (B , g ,q (m ))−U (B , g ,q (n ))
U (B , g ,q (n ))−U (B ,b , 0) ≤
n −m
m
. (A.3)
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Similarly, the condition W (n ; n )−W (m ; n )≥ 0 is equivalent to
U (G , g ,q (m ))−U (G , g ,q (n ))
U (G , g ,q (n ))−U (G ,b , 0) ≤
n −m
m
. (A.4)
When Assumption 4 holds, [U (G , g ,q )−U (G ,b , 0)]/[U (B , g ,q )−U (B ,b , 0)] is decreasing
in q ∈ (q ∗, 1). So,
U (G , g ,q (m ))−U (G ,b , 0)
U (B , g ,q (m ))−U (B ,b , 0) ≤
U (G , g ,q (n ))−U (G ,b , 0)
U (B , g ,q (n ))−U (B ,b , 0) .
This condition implies
U (B , g ,q (m ))−U (B , g ,q (n ))
U (B , g ,q (n ))−U (B ,b , 0) ≤
U (G , g ,q (m ))−U (G , g ,q (n ))
U (G , g ,q (n ))−U (G ,b , 0) .
Hence, (A.3) implies (A.4). It follows that if p (m ; n ) > 0 for some n > m ≥ l , then
W (m ; 0) > W (n ; 0). By part (ii) of Lemma 1, W (m ; k ) > W (n ; k ) for any k ≤ m , which
contradicts (A.1). 
LetP 1 denote the collection of all sequences of reporting strategies P1 = (p1, . . . , pN )
that are compatible. The next two lemmas establish thatP 1 is non-empty, closed, and
connected.
L A.3. Let Pn+1 = (pn+1, . . . , pN ) be compatible with l . Then the set of reporting
strategies in state n compatible with l given Pn+1 is non-empty, closed, and connected.
P. (i) For n > l the claim is trivially true since by Definition A.1 there is a unique
pn compatible with l given Pn+1 and it has p (n ; n ) = 1.
(ii) For n = l , the definition of compatibility implies that p l is compatible if and
only if (a) pn (m ) = 0 for all m < l , (b) p (l ; l ) ∈ [0, 1], (c) for each l < m < N , p (m ; l )
is equal to the minimum of 1−∑k<m p (k ; l ) and the value such that W (l ; l |p l , P l +1) =
W (m ; l |p l , P l +1), and (d) p (N ; l ) = 1−∑k<N p (k ; l ). Note that W (l ; l |p l , P l +1) is inde-
pendent of p l . Further, for all m > l the function W (m ; l |p l , P l +1) depends only on
p (m ; l ), is strictly decreasing in p (m ; l ), and satisfies W (l ; l |p l , P l +1)<W (m ; l |p l , P l +1)
when p (m ; l ) = 0. Thus, the set of compatible p l is non-empty and it is closed because
each compatible p l is uniquely determined by the value of p (l ; l ) and there exists a com-
patible p l for each value of p (l ; l ) ∈ [0, 1]. Finally, if p l is compatible and {p il }i=1,2,... is a
sequence of compatible strategies with limi→∞p i (l ; l ) = p (l ; l ) then limi→∞p i (m ; l ) =
p (m ; l ) for each m = 0, . . . , N , hence the set of compatible strategies is connected.
(iii) For n < l , the definition of compatibility implies that there is exactly one pn
compatible with l given Pn+1 if t n+1 = N or W (t n ′ ; n
′|Pn+1)<W (t n ′ ; n ′|Pn+1) for some
n < n ′. Otherwise, pn is compatible if and only if
(a) for each m < t n+1, p (m ; n ) = 0
(b) p (t n+1; n ) is non-negative and not larger that the minimum of 1 and the largest
value such that W (t n ′ − 1; n ′ | Pn ) ≤ W (t n ′ ; n ′ | Pn ) = W (t n ′ ; n ′ | Pn ) for all n <
n ′ ≤ l
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(c) if p (t n+1; n )> 0 then
(c-i) p (m ; n ) is the minimum of 1 − ∑k<m p (k ; n ) and the value such that
W (t n+1; n | Pn ) = W (m ; n | Pn ) for each t n+1 <m <N and
(c-ii) p (N ; m ) = 1−∑k<N p (k ; n )
(d) if p (t n+1; n ) = 0 then
(d-i) p (t n+1 +1; n ) is at least as large as the minimum of 1 and the value such that
W (t n+1; n + 1 | Pn ) = W (t n+1 + 1; n + 1 | Pn ) and it is at most as large as the
minimum of 1 and the value such that W (t n+1; n | Pn ) = W (t n+1 +1; n | Pn )
(d-ii) for each t n+1+1<m <N , p (m ; n ) is the minimum of 1−∑k<m p (m ; n ) and
the value such that W (t n+1 +1; n | Pn ) = W (m ; n | Pn )
(d-iii) p (N ; n ) = 1−∑k<N p (k ; n ).
By the compatibility of Pn+1, p (t n+1; n ) = 0 satisfies (b). Hence the set of all values
of p (t n+1; n ) that satisfy (b) is non-empty, closed, and connected. Further, for each
p (t n+1; n )> 0 that satisfies (b), p (m ; n ) is uniquely determined by (c) for each m > t n+1.
When p (t n+1; n ) = 0 instead, if t n+1+1 = N , p (t n+1+1; n ) is uniquely determined equal
to 1 by (d-iii). Otherwise, note that q (m | Pn ) depends only on p (m ; n ), is strictly de-
creasing in p (m ; n ), and satisfies q (m | Pn ) = 1 when pn (m ) = 0 for each m > t n+1.
Further, by Lemma 1, the value such that W (t n+1; n + 1 | Pn ) = W (t n+1 + 1; n + 1 | Pn )
is smaller than the value such that W (t n+1; n | Pn ) = W (t n+1 + 1; n | Pn ). It follows
that the set of values of p (t n+1 + 1; n ) that satisfy (d-i) is non-empty, closed, and con-
nected, and for each such value, p (m ; n ) is uniquely determined by (d-ii) and (d-iii) for
all m > t n+1 +1. Finally, when p (t n+1 +1; n ) assumes the maximum value that respects
condition (d-i), the resulting pn also satisfies condition (c). 
L A.4. The set P 1 is non-empty, closed, and connected.
P. An immediate implication of Lemma A.3 and the definition of compatibility is
that, for each l , the collection of all P1 compatible with l is non-empty, closed, con-
nected, and completely ordered by >LF . We show that for each 0 < l < N , the smallest
P1 compatible with l is also compatible with l −1. The claim then follows from observ-
ing that the largest P1 compatible with N − 1 has p (N ; n ) = 1 for all n = 1, . . . , N , which
is the only sequence of reporting strategies compatible with N .
Let P1 be a reporting strategy compatible with l such that p (l ; l ) = 1 and p (l ; l −1) is
the minimum of 1 and the value such that W (l ; l −1 | P l−1) = W (l −1; l −1 | P l−1). This
implies that P l−1 also is compatible with l −1. The lemma follows by noting that for all
n < l −1 the definition that pn is compatible with l is identical to the definition that pn
is compatible with l −1. 
Next, consider the correspondenceφ :P 1→R defined by
φ(P1) =

x ∈R | x =∑
m
p (m ; 0) for some p0 compatible with P1

.
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For each compatible P1, the setφ(P1) is obtained by first finding all vectors p0 compati-
ble with P1 and then by summing over all entries for each such vector. By Lemma A.2, for
any equilibrium P = (p0, P1), we have φ(P1) 3 1. Further, if φ(P1) 3 1 for some P1 ∈P 1,
then there exists p0 such that P = (p0, P1) is an equilibrium. The following properties of
φ are used to conclude the proof of the proposition.
L A.5. For all P1 ∈P 1, the setφ(P1) is closed and convex, andφ is upper hemicon-
tinuous.
P. First we establish thatφ(P1) is closed and convex. Let P1 be compatible with l .
We distinguish three cases.
(i) If l = 0, then p (n ; n ) = 1 for all n = 1, . . . , N and by Definition A.2, p0 is compatible
if and only if p (0; 0)∈ [0, 1] and p (m ; 0) = (1−q ∗)pim /(q ∗pi0) for all m = 1, . . . , N .
(ii) If l = N , then p (N ; n ) = 1 for all n = 1, . . . , N and by Definition A.2, p0 is compatible
if and only if p (m ; 0) = 0 for all m = 0, . . . , N − 1, and p (N ; 0) is not larger that the
value such that W (N −1; N − 1 | p0, P1) = W (N ; N − 1 | p0, P1). Such a value exists
and is unique since W (N ; N − 1 | p0, P1) is continuous and strictly decreasing in
p (0; 0), W (N ; N −1 | p0, P1)>W (N −1; N −1 | p0, P1) in the limit as p (N ; 0)→−∞,
and W (N ; N −1 | p0, P1)<W (N −1; N −1 | p0, P1) in the limit as p (N ; 0)→+∞.
(iii) If 0< l <N , an argument analogous to that in part (iii) of the proof of Lemma A.3
can be used to establish that the set of vectors p0 compatible with P1 is non-
empty, closed, connected, and compact. Thus, the function
∑
m p (m ; 0) on the
set of compatible vectors p0 has a minimum and maximum and assumes all val-
ues in between.
To prove that φ is upper hemicontinuous by contradiction, we assume that there is
a sequence of P1(i ) with limi→∞P1(i ) = P1, and a sequence of p0(i ) with limi→∞p0(i ) =
p0, such that p0(i ) is compatible with P1(i ) for all i but p0 is not compatible with P1. By
definition of compatibility, there exists n such that W (tn ; n | p0, P1) <W (m ; n | p0, P1)
with tn ∈ Tn . This implies that for i large enough, W (tn ; n | p0(i ), P1(i )) < W (m ; n |
p0(i ), P1(i )) and tn ∈ Tn (i ), a contradiction of compatibility. 
To complete the proof of the proposition, note that the reporting strategy P1 de-
fined by p (n ; n ) = 1 for all n = 1, . . . , N is compatible. By Definition A.2, there is a vec-
tor p0 compatible with P1 such that p (0; 0) = 1 and p (m ; 0) > 0 for all m > 1. Thus,
maxφ(P1) > 1. On the other hand, the reporting strategy P1 defined by p (N ; n ) = 1 for
all n = 1, . . . , N is also compatible. By Definition A.2, any vector p0 with p (m ; 0) = 0 for
all m < N and p (N ; 0) sufficiently small is compatible with P1, and therefore φ(P1) is
unbounded from below. Since φ is upper hemicontinuous, there exists some P1 such
that φ(P1) 3 1, establishing the existence of an inflationary equilibrium. To establish
a sufficient condition for an equilibrium to have threshold l > 0, note that the only P1
compatible with l = 0 has p (n ; n ) = 1 for all n = 1, . . . , N , and the minimum of φ(P1) is
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achieved by p (0; 0) = 0 and p (m ; 0) = (1−q ∗)pim /(q ∗pi0). Thus, if pi0 < 1−q ∗, there is an
inflationary equilibrium with l > 0. 
P  L . First, we show that if X is exchangeable and MTP2, then, for
any i , (X i , Yi ,Zi ,Z˜i ) is MTP2. If X is exchangeable and MRR2, then, for any i ,
(X i , Yi , N −1−Zi , N −1− Z˜i ) is MTP2.
Since X is exchangeable, for any two realizations x and x ′ of X such that
∑
i x i =∑
i x
′
i , we have f (x ) = f (x
′). Let f n represent the probability of x such that
∑
i x i = n .
Assume that f is MTP2. Let h(x i , z i ) be the joint probability function of (X i ,Zi ). For
z i ≥ z ′i , we have
h(1, z i )h(0, z ′i ) =

N −1
z i

N −1
z ′i

f z i +1 f z ′i
≥

N −1
z i

N −1
z ′i

f z i f z ′i +1 = h(1, z
′
i )h(0, z i ).
Thus, h(x i , z i ) is also MTP2.
Now consider the conditional distributionsφ(yi | x i ) andψ(z˜ i | z i ). These are
φ(yi | x i ) =

0 if yi < x i
1 if yi = x i = 1
β (1−x i , yi −x i , p ) otherwise
ψ(z˜ i | z i ) =

0 if z˜ i < z i
1 if z˜ i = z i = N −1
β (N −1− z i , z˜ i − z i , p ) otherwise.
It is straightforward to verify that both φ and ψ are MTP2. The joint distribution of
(X i , Yi ,Zi ,Z˜i ) is simply h(x i , z i )φ(yi | x i )ψ(z˜ i | z i ). Since each of these component func-
tions is MTP2, the joint distribution is MTP2. When f is MRR2, using a reasoning similar
to the one above we can establish that the joint distribution of (X i , Yi , N−1−Zi , N−1−Z˜i )
is also MTP2.
By the above result, if f is MTP2, then (X i , Yi ,Zi ,Z˜i ) is MTP2. Since the marginal
distribution of any subset of a MTP2 vector is itself MTP2 (Karlin and Rinott 1980,
Proposition 3.1), this means that the joint distribution of (X i , Yi ,Z˜i ) is MTP2. Sup-
pose h∗(z˜ i | x i , yi ) represents the conditional probability function of Z˜i given X i and
Yi . The MTP2 property of the joint distribution implies that, for any z˜ i ≥ z˜ ′i , we
have h∗(z˜ i | 1, 1)h∗(z˜ ′i | 0, 1) ≥ h∗(z˜ i | 0, 1)h∗(z˜ ′i | 1, 1), and thus the likelihood ratio
h∗(· | 1, 1)/h∗(· | 0, 1) is monotone increasing, implying that the distribution {r G (m )} first-
order stochastically dominates {r B (m )}.
When f is MRR2, the joint distribution of (X i , Yi , N−1−Z˜i ) is MTP2. This implies that
the likelihood ratio h∗(· | 1, 1)/h∗(· | 0, 1) is monotone decreasing. Hence, the distribution
{r B (m )} first-order stochastically dominates {r G (m )}. 
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P  L . Suppose f is MTP2. Let h∗∗(x i | yi , z˜ i ) represent the conditional
probability function of X i given Yi and Z˜i . By the same argument as in Lemma 4, the
joint distribution of these three variables is MTP2. Therefore, for m ≥ m ′, the condi-
tional distribution satisfies
h∗∗(1 | 1, m −1)h∗∗(0 | 1, m ′−1)≥ h∗∗(0 | 1, m −1)h∗∗(1 | 1, m ′−1).
This condition implies that q (m ) = h∗∗(1 | 1, m −1)≥ h∗∗(1 | 1, m ′−1) =q (m ′).
When f is MRR2, we have q (m ′)≥q (m ) for m ≥m ′, as
h∗∗(1 | 1, m ′−1)h∗∗(0 | 1, m −1)≥ h∗∗(0 | 1, m ′−1)h∗∗(1 | 1, m −1). 
P  L . For each m = 1, . . . , N ,
r B (m ) =
N−1∑
n=0
Pr[Z˜i = m −1 |X i = 0, Yi = 1,Zi = n ]Pr[Zi = n |X i = 0, Yi = 1]
=
m−1∑
n=0
β (N −n −1, m −n −1, p ) pin
1−pi
N −n
N
=
m∑
n=0
pinβ (N −n , m −n , p ) m −n
N (1−pi)p .
For each m = 1, . . . , N , define
N (m ) =
m∑
n=0
pinβ (N −n , m −n , p )n
D(m ) =
m∑
n=0
pinβ (N −n , m −n , p )m .
Since
∑N
m=1 r
B (m ) = 1, we have
N∑
m=1
D(m )−N (m )= N (1−pi)p .
Note that since r G (m ) =N (m )/(piN ), from∑Nm=1 r G (m ) = 1 we have
N∑
m=1
N (m ) = Npi,
and hence
N∑
m=1
D(m ) = N (pi+(1−pi)p ).
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Finally, note that from equation (6) we have q (m ) = N (m )/D(m ). Since r B (m ) =
(N (m )−D(m ))/(N (1−pi)p ), we have
N∑
m=1
r B (m )q (m ) =
1
N (1−pi)p
N∑
m=1
D(m )q (m )(1−q (m )).
Since q (1− q ) is concave in q , Jensen’s inequality implies that the above expression is
less than or equal to∑N
m=1D(m )
N (1−pi)p
 ∑N
m=1 q (m )D(m )∑N
m=1D(m )
! 
1−
∑N
m=1 q (m )D(m )∑N
m=1D(m )
!
.
The lemma follows immediately. 
L A.6. For any small and positive ε,
lim
N→∞
∑
n∈[N (pi−ε),N (pi+ε)]
∑
m>N (pi+ε)
piNn p
N (m ; n ) = 0,
where piNn = (1−α)β (N , n ,pi).
P. The claim is trivially true if α = 1. Assume α < 1. Suppose that for some small
ε> 0 there exists a subsequence in N such that
lim
N→∞
∑
n∈[N (pi−ε),N (pi+ε)]
∑
m>N (pi+ε)
piNn p
N (m ; n )> 0.
Since
∑
n 6∈[N (pi−γ),N (pi+γ)]piNn equals α< 1 in the limit for any γ> 0,
lim
N→∞
∑
n∈[N (pi−γ),N (pi+γ)]
∑
m>N (pi+ε)
piNn p
N (m ; n )> 0.
Define the collection of messages
MN = ¦m > (pi+ε)N | p N (m ; n )> 0 for some n ∈ [N (pi−γ), N (pi+γ)]© .
The setMN contains all messages larger that N (pi+ε) that are sent with positive prob-
ability in some state n close to piN . We claim that N 6∈ MN for sufficiently large N ;
otherwise, p N (N ; 0) = 1 by Lemma 3 and we would have a sequence of equilibria with
q N (N ) approaching pi and q N (n ) for n close to Npi approaching 1, which contradicts
condition (11). Now, since
lim
N→∞
∑
n>N (pi+γ)
∑
m∈MN
piNn p
N (m ; n ) = 0,
we have
lim
N→∞ supm∈MN
∑
n<N (pi+γ)pi
N
n p
N (m ; n )∑
n pi
N
n p
N (m ; n )
= 1.
364 Damiano, Li, and Suen Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
For any m ∈MN , the equilibrium belief q (m )N is given by∑
n<N (pi+γ)pi
N
n p
N (m ; n )n/m +
∑
n>N (pi+γ)pi
N
n p
N (m ; n )min{n/m , 1}∑
n pi
N
n p
N (m ; n )
≤ ((pi+γ)N /m )
∑
n<N (pi+γ)pi
N
n p
N (m ; n )+
∑
n>N (pi+γ)pi
N
n p
N (m ; n )∑
n pi
N
n p
N (m ; n )
.
Thus
lim
N→∞ infm∈MN mq
N (m )≤N (pi+γ).
Since q N (n ) becomes arbitrarily close to 1 for all n close to Npi, for γ sufficiently small
and N sufficiently large there exists m ∈ MN such that by condition (11), W (n ; n ) >
W (m ; n ) for all n ∈ [N (pi−γ), N (pi+γ)], a contradiction. 
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